Part 10

Before leaving Waterloo it will be interesting to note the fact that the fights of those days were far more concentrated than they are to – day. For example:-

At Ligny (where 155,000 combatants were engaged) the dead and wounded (some 20,500) lay on two square miles of ground after the battle. After Waterloo (where 192,000 were engaged) 46,000 killed and wounded lay on some three square miles of country – giving much the same proportion as Ligny. But after the battle of Gravelotte – St.Privat, August 18, 1870 (where again about 192,000 were actually engaged), the 33,000 killed and wounded lay on twenty square miles of country; this gives a very different density to Waterloo, where much the same numbers were engaged, and clearly shows that modern battles are fought over much larger areas than was the case in the time of Napoleon.

No sane man will now say that Wellington could have stood alone at Waterloo against the troops which Napoleon had assembled. There are some who occasionally say “ Blücher saved the British at Waterloo.” It would be at least equally just to say that Wellington saved Blücher. Each was absolutely necessary to the other. But every one must admire the decision of Gneisenau, who, after Ligny, first directed the Prussians on Wavre, and then also the eagerness of Blücher in marching to Waterloo, and urging on his infantry to assist in hauling the embogged cannon through the miry meadows between Wavre and Mont St, Lambert, so that he might keep his word and arrive in time on the field of battle.

Reviewing the campaign as a whole, the salient features are the difficulties and dangers incurred by two armies on divergent lines endeavouring to combine on the battlefield; and the decisive success achieved when they do so combine. Other inferences that may be drawn from the incidents of this campaign may be divided into two heads, strategical and tactical. Those connected with Strategy are: -

1. Vigorously offensive strategy often offers the best chance of success to the weaker of two belligerents. 
2. Single lines have many advantages over double, or divergent, lines; but when armies operating on divergent lines can manage to combine on the battlefield, the blow delivered is generally fatal. But of course much depends on the pursuit: if that is relentless, the full fruits of the victory are reaped; otherwise the beaten army recovers in due course, and again shows front. 
3. Concentration of every available man at the decisive point is a fundamental principle of sound strategy. 
4. Time is a most valuable asset. To waste it is to court disaster. 
5. Surprise is a most powerful weapon both in strategy and tactics. 
6. “It is a principle that admits of no exception that the concentration of an army should take place out of striking distance of the enemy.” 
7. It is important that all considerable detachments should be kept informed of the situation elsewhere. 
8. War is not a conjectural art. Every effort should be made to obtain certain information. When this fails, it is preferable to form some definite plan and carry it through energetically rather than do nothing; but this plan must be based on a careful study of the situation and the right application of the principles of war thereto. It is most important that preparations be made to meet other possible contingencies. 
9. A thorough performance of staff duties is essential. It is not every subordinate commander that is qualified for the duties of the chief of the staff. The strange redistribution of staff duties in the Grand Army of 1815 was largely responsible for the disaster that followed. 
10. The assumption of responsibility by subordinates at a critical moment is to be encouraged, but orders once given by a superior should be faithfully obeyed unless the situation for which that order was intended has changed between its issue and receipt, e.g. Prince Bernard’s and Perponcher’s march to Quatre Bras are fine examples of correct and ready assumption of initiative. more

The opposite is the case with Marshal Grouchy when he was faced with a situation on June 18 that obviously contravened the spirit of his instructions. Like all weak commanders, he decided that rather than follow the hazardous advice of his generals and march to the assistance of his Emperor, who was then hotly engaged, as the thunder of the cannon testified, he would keep blindly to the letter of the Emperor’s instructions, which he felt would cover him whatever happened.

Under the head of Tactics may be classed: -

1. Personal reconnaissance is of great value to a commander, e.g. Wellington after Quatre Bras, Napoleon at Ligny and Waterloo. Nowadays a personal reconnaissance will very seldom be possible, and it is therefore all the more important that general officers should be provided with a competent and well – trained staff, capable of making reconnaissance on the same lines. Two officers may be equally competent to make a good reconnaissance, but if they, so to speak, use different languages, the net result will not be very comprehensible to the officer who has to utilise it. 
2. Large reserves and their timely use will frequently decide the issue of a battle. 
3. There are other means besides the dangerous flank attack of driving an enemy from his position. Napoleon’s favourite plan of a general and sustained attack supported by massed guns, which were used to blow a hole in the opposing battle – line, and culminating in a central attack by a large body of fresh troops held in reserve all day for the purpose, usually succeeded; and it is not impossible that it would succeed to – day, for preparation by shrapnel now takes the place of the case – shot attack of the Napoleonic times. 
4. Cavalry is largely ineffective against formed and unshaken infantry, unless it takes them by surprise. When charging, it requires support to rally on and to re – form on. It should always therefore keep a reserve in hand. One of its most important rôles is that of obtaining information. Failure in this respect is apt to bring disaster in its train. 
5. Even in those days of slow – loading weapons, indications are to be found that superiority of fire – effect was the deciding factor in the tactical struggle, e.g. the frequent repulse of Napoleon’s columns by British line. As the Emperor had so wisely remarked: “Fire is everything, and the rest nothing.” But he also held that it is not sufficient that the soldier should shoot, but he must shoot well. And good shooting is not a matter merely of goodwill, or of expert marksmanship at the butts; but rather, in the battle, it is the result of discipline. 
6. Concentrated artillery fire had a shattering and demoralising effect on the enemy, and prepares the way for the frontal infantry attack. As has already been mentioned, Napoleon relied on his case – shot attack to overwhelm any front which his enemies sought to oppose to his advance. This form of attack was first initiated as a comprehensive idea at the battle of Friedland, on June 14, 1807. It proved most successful, and much simplified the Emperor’s strategy, for by its means he endeavoured to overwhelm his opponent within the time limit, and so defeat him ere any support could arrive. The storm of grape hurled against the enemy at 300 yards range in those times is replaced by rafales of shrapnel, which sweep the defender’s lines to – day with a sheet of lead, from a range of 3,000 yards. 
7. To neglect pursuit is to sacrifice the fruits of victory. Pursuit should be vigorous and well sustained, and fresh troops should be employed for that purpose. Nowadays the organisation of a vigorous and immediate pursuit will be an operation of no little difficulty. 
8. The state of the weather must not be neglected in military operations. The heavy rain, in delaying Blücher, exposed Wellington to tactical defeat. Climate will always impose limitations on both tactics and strategy. But the two great storms on the evening of June 16, and in the afternoon of June 17, considerably interfered with Napoleon’s plans. Grouchy, on June 18, pleaded the state of the rough, boggy cross – roads between Wavre and Mont St. Jean as one of the excuses for not marching to the latter place to the relief of his Emperor. He stated that with the roads in their then sodden state, he could not arrive in time to be of any use.

Although the rain did delay Blücher’s march, it assisted Wellington by putting an obstacle in Grouchy’s path; and, better still, it delayed, for several valuable hours, Napoleon’s attack on the British position.

Before leaving the campaign we may briefly enumerate the causes of Napoleon’s ultimate defeat, despite the fact that by his brilliant opening move he had gained a great advantage over the Allies. It is suggested that the most important reasons are as follows:-

1. The staunchness of Wellington’s force. Their good discipline enabled them to show a determined front to Napoleon long after the time they should have been overwhelmed, according to ordinary calculation. This upsetting of the time limit gave Blücher the chance to intervene successfully on the battlefield. And this staunch resistance was due to the discipline of the army, which enabled all ranks to bear with fortitude and determination the strain of that long day. And discipline ensured that in resisting each attack, every regiment brought all its musket – barrels to bear full and telling on the advancing masses. 
2. Blücher’s loyalty to his ally. This feature as a rule is inconspicuous in coalition wars; and history may be searched in vain for the record of an ally more staunch and true than the indomitable Blücher. 
3. The failure of Napoleon’s subordinates to rise to the height of the occasion.
4. Grouchy’s failure to find and hold Blücher.
   1. If the Emperor was to succeed in beating the Allies in detail, it was necessary that one should be destroyed whilst the other was prevented from co – operating at that moment. At Quatre Bras, on June 16, Ney gave full employment for all the men Wellington could concentrate: and Napoleon beat Blücher at Ligny. But Grouchy failed to hold Blücher at Wavre on the 18th; and Waterloo resulted from Blücher’s intervention coming in time and in sufficient force; this, of course, was partly due to the lateness of the commencement of Napoleon’s attack on Wellington.
          Grouchy indeed showed that he could not command the force entrusted to him with intelligence.
          Throughout the campaign it will be noticed that the distances are cramped. The Allies, on and after the 16th, are within two days’ march of each other, and these proportions are too small for safety, and enormously increase the risk of operating on interior lines.
      
   2. And next let us briefly consider Ney’s faults – his timidity before Quatre Bras on the 15th and early on the 16th; and his reckless daring at Mont St. Jean, when he attempted to hurl down an unshaken infantry, occupying a dominant position, with his magnificent horsemen. For without preparation, without supports, without orders, and before the appointed time, he deliberately risked the great movement planned by the Emperor. He even engaged the last cavalry reserve of the army in his mad enterprise. Further, how did he fail to recognise that La Haye Sainte was the key of the whole allied position?[1] Why did he not batter it down with artillery, instead of making three assaults on the place, held, too, by only a battalion of infantry? When he did carry it, it was too late to turn the gain to advantage.

We need not elaborate further the blunders of the Emperor’s subordinates, for men who take the field in the frame of mind that they possessed can hardly be expected to think clearly when the crisis occurs. But we may say that had Napoleon been served as well in this brief campaign as he had in the days of his great victories, the result would have been very different. In fact the all – powerful engine of war constructed by the Emperor was either worn out, or at least badly overstrained.

Lastly, Napoleon’s deterioration. Whatever may be urged in the great Emperor’s favour, arguing from his fine opening moves and other reasons, the thoughtful will hardly claim that he was the general of 1796, 1800, 1805, 1806, or 1807.

For he had lost, on his own evidence, his belief in his star, and no longer felt convinced that he must succeed. Whilst at the zenith of his power, he had been a bold, audacious gambler; but now, as his powers declined, he became more timid in his play, and in this campaign we see him waiting for the lucky moment. It comes, it passes by unrecognised, or at least unutilised, and the Emperor no longer will dare all, to win all.

 

 

 

 

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