Part 8

On the night of June 17 – 18, Napoleon and Wellington remained facing each other about Waterloo. The Emperor by means of a masterly reconnaissance in force, late on the afternoon of June 17, discovered that the whole Anglo – Dutch army had taken position on the plateau of Mont St. Jean. Blücher was at Wavre, and Grouchy having at last discovered Blücher’s true position, halted in and around Gembloux for the night. During this night Napoleon displayed considerable anxiety lest Wellington should continue his retirement and escape him, and he personally visited his outposts. The spectacle of the French Emperor visiting his own outposts is evidence of the importance that great commanders of the past attributed, and rightly so, to personal reconnaissance.

Click maps to enlarge.

The dispositions of Wellington and Napoleon on the morning of June 18 afford some contrast. The former, leaving nothing to chance, places 17,000 men at Hal and Tubize to guard his right flank. The latter, taking his hypotheses as facts, leaves his right flank unguarded, except for a detachment made in accordance with theories that all the information available tended to disprove. But on the other hand Napoleon, as was his custom, concentrated every available man for the battle.

It is right here to speak plainly of the strategical error, with which Wellington is charged, of leaving some 17,000 men, under Prince Frederick of the Netherlands, at Hal and Tubize (at this latter place, on the way to Hal, Colville’s two brigades were halted). Ever anxious about his communications with the sea, and fearing that a French corps might turn his right, he committed the strategic blunder of sending a body of men on the eve of a great battle to parry an imaginary danger. The presence in line of battle of Colville’s brigades might well have kept the British line from that critical hour which occurred before Zieten came up. It is inconceivable that Wellington should have credited his adversary with a plan of operations that must, by forcing him into Blücher's arms, have brought about an immediate allied concentration, for from the very outset Napoleon had been evidently manoeuvring to prevent such a junction.

Returning to Grouchy’s force, it is again noticeable that may of the hostile criticisms are founded on a misconception as to how the situation appeared to Napoleon, and also as to the duties of a containing force. Napoleon knew that Blücher, though defeated, was not crushed, and consequently detached Grouchy to contain him. As Blücher was greatly superior in numbers to Grouchy the detachment cannot be objected to on strategical grounds, especially as his presumed line of retreat was such that if not contained he would be able to reorganise and advance against the French communications, and cut their line of retreat, in a few days. During the night of the 17 – 18th, Napoleon heard from Grouchy enough to have made it clear that his presumption as to the Prussian retreat was false. Why did he not recall Grouchy? It is suggested that a very good reason is to be found in the presumption that the vigorous attack of 33,000 victorious troops on the rear of a defeated army of 80,000 would probably suffice to detain that army at the spot where it was attacked, or else to turn orderly retirement into hasty retreat. Consequently there is something to be said in favour of Grouchy’s attack on Warve. Moreover, the capture of Warve conferred considerable strategic advantages on Grouchy as it placed him within easy striking distance of Louvain, through which place ran Blücher’s last line of communication with Cologne. Numerous other points for and against Grouchy’s action have been brought forward by various historians, but enough has been said to show that in the light of what was then known there is much to be said in favour of the course actually pursued.

But the execution again was not equal to the conception. Grouchy failed his master at a critical hour. At least, on advancing on Wavre, it would have been prudent to have crossed to the R.Dyle’s left bank at Mousty, so as to ensure the safety of his communications with the Grand Army. As it was, fruitless hours were spent forcing the Dyle passages, during the afternoon, against Thielemann, who fought stubbornly to prevent the crossing taking place. Again, with the cannon of Waterloo thundering in his ears at Walhain, although there might be no mistake regarding the tenour of the instructions he had received, yet the fact was becoming every moment more palpable that these instructions were based on a false hypothesis.

Before the Marshal’s troops closed up, he was aware that the bulk of the Prussians were at Wavre; and at the same moment there could have been no doubt in his mind that the Emperor was heavily engaged at Mont St. Jean. The roar of the cannon, every moment becoming more insistent, and reverberating over Brabant, proclaimed this fact with ever - increasing clearness. Grouchy now simply had to examine the possibility of the Prussians manoeuvring towards Wellington. The probability was that they would; what otherwise could have been their object in abandoning their proper line of communications, or in Wellington’s offering battle at Mont St. Jean? If this were so, a further advance on Wavre would be directly opposed to the spirit of the Marshal’s instructions from his Emperor. Therefore, taking all this into account, it will probably be considered that Grouchy evinced a lack of those qualities required in an independent commander. Generally, as the Prussians exemplified in 1870, it is a fairly safe rule to follow – when in doubt march to the sound of the cannon.

On the morning of the 18th, after a very wet night, Napoleon did not immediately attack, but occupied himself till 11 a.m. in making a careful personal reconnaissance and in holding his last review. At that hour the dispositions of each side, briefly stated, were (vide Plan No.2): -

Anglo – Dutch.- In Hougoumont, 1,200 to 1,400 men. The garrison was composed of a detachment of the British Guards, one battalion of Perponcher’s men, and some Hanovarians.

In La Haye Sainte, 376 men of the K.G.L., under Major Baring.

The Sand Pit was held by a detachment of the 95th Rifles.

In the enclosures on the left, Smohain, Papelotte and La Haye, 3,200 men, of Saxe – Weimar’s Brigade.

In the hollow road were 1,200 men, the whole making a strong outpost line of about 6,000 men. This line may be regarded as a “false front” to the true position. However, it must not be forgotten that La Haye Sainte was the key to the whole position.

The main position, extending along the northern ridge from the Nivelles road to the Farm of Smohain, was held by 31,000 men in two lines – the first line 16,000; the second line 15,000; both lines concealed from the French by the crest of the ridge.

The position of Bylandt's Dutch-Belgians must be expected; for this brigade was unaccountably posted down the forward slope and thus became subjected to a terrific fire from the French Great Battery, at horse-pistol range, ere D'Erlon's attack was delivered. Its moral became so sapped that, on the french advancing to the attack, it broke and fled to the rear in considerable disorder.

Reserves, 13,000 infantry, were placed in rear of the right and centre.

Two brigades of Light Cavalry (those of Vivian and Vendeleur) were in rear of the left flank.

The two Heavy Brigades (of Somerset and Ponsonby) were astride the Charleroi road.

Two brigades and two regiments of Light Horse were in rear of the right, in the angle between the Charleroi road and the Nivelles road, and, together with some five brigades   cavalry, were attached to the reserve.

Picton commanded the left, the Prince of Orange the centre, and Hill the right of the line of battle.

The artillery was divided more or less into three portions: 50 guns along the front of the position; 50 guns on the right of the position on the hill above Merbe Braine; 50 guns with the reserve, this latter including 16 guns that arrived during the action. Besides these there were 6 guns with the cavalry on the left. (This was Gardiner’s Troop of R.H.A. attached to Vivian’s Cavalry Brigade). Thus the army that Wellington concentrated on the Mont St. Jean position, with which to offer a decisive battle to the Emperor, was about 67,000 strong, and it included some 12,000 horse and 156 guns. We have already dealt with the detachment he maintained at Hal and Tubize, and consequently need not refer to that matter again here.

Napoleon’s force was disposed: -

Right Wing, 16,000, under D’Erlon, Charleroi road nearly to Frischermont. Left Wing, 15,000, under Reille, from La Belle Alliance to the Nivelle road. In the centre two divisions of Lobau’s Corps, 6,000, on the Charleroi road. In reserve, the Imperial Guard, 12,000, astride the Charleroi road, and in rear of the centre.

Cavalry. – One division (Jacquinôt) on the right flank; one division (Piré) on the left flank. In rear of the Right Wing, Milhaud’s Corps. In rear of the Left Wing, Kellerman’s Corps. The Light Cavalry of the Guard (Lefebvre – Desnouettes) were in rear of Milhaud; the Reserve Cavalry of the Guard (Guyot) were in rear of Kellerman. Two divisions of cavalry (those of Domon and Subervie) were with Lobau’s infantry in the centre, but on the east of the Charleroi road. The artillery numbered 246 guns: 84 in front line, 36 with the cavalry, 30 with the infantry in the centre, and 96 with the Guard in reserve. Thus Napoleon had gathered for the assault of Wellington’s position some 74,000; this force included some 15,000 cavalry and the 246 guns already mentioned.

These dispositions throw some light on the reasons for Wellington’s retention of Colville at Hal. They clearly show that Wellington regarded his right as the probable flank to be attacked.  Having regard to the direction of his line of communication with Ostend, his right was certainly his strategical flank; but on the other hand, it was undoubtedly to Napoleon’s interest to keep Blücher and Wellington apart, which could best be effected by turning the English left.

But Wellington’s dispositions, even at this advanced stage of the campaign, bear traces of the fact that he still feared an advance by the French through Mons and Hal to Brussels. Thus only can be explained the strong detachments at Hal and Tubize, and the large accumulation, chiefly consisting of his choicest troops, on his right flank.

The only other mistake which can be urged against him in his preparation to resist the impact of Napoleon’s onslaught, and to give sufficient time to allow the Prussians to bear their part in the great battle, was the slight garrison provided for La Haye Sainte, and the inadequate steps taken to fortify it. The place was suitable for a garrison of 1,000 strong; and being the key to the Duke’s left centre, and covering, too, a vulnerable point in his line, its importance should have been recognised. As it was, its fall in the late afternoon brought about that critical hour which might well have unnerved a less resolute commander than Wellington.

In all other respects his position was most skilfully taken up, for his forces were so arrayed that hardly any of the defenders were exposed, and the reserve were well shielded. In fact it was the converse of the Ligny position, where the Prussian reserves had been exposed to Napoleon’s eye, and many of them to his artillery fire, long ere they were brought into action. To ensure further cohesion in his miscellaneous array, Wellington (to support the various allied contingents) placed them alternately along the line with his own national troops interspersed between them.

Of Napoleon’s Grand Army, the last one of the Empire, every man was visible from the allied position. The Emperor’s plan of battle, too, was as simple as the array of his troops, for it contemplated nothing more and nothing less than smashing in the allied centre with a tremendous frontal attack.

Whilst Wellington was inspecting his position, Müffling was meanwhile engaged in making the final arrangements for the Prussian co – operation. The scheme, for each of the three probable cases that might arise, was as follows: -

1. Should Wellington’s right be attacked, the Prussians should march to Ohain and support the Duke.
2. If the centre, or left, were selected for attack, then one Prussian corps would march through St. Lambert and Lasne and outflank the French right; and another body would move by Ohain and support Wellington.
3. Should the French advance on St. Lambert, then the Prussians would receive the attack, whilst Wellington operated on the French left flank and rear.[1]

About 11.30 a.m. Napoleon was seen to be directing his attack, presumably against the allied centre, and a message was sent forthwith to Blücher that the second case was occurring, and asking for Prussian help as arranged. Müffling, having just been informed that Bülow led the Prussian advance from Wavre, directed his A.D.C. to show Bülow the letter he was sending on the matter to Blücher. But the indomitable old man himself was in the forefront of the advance, and he proceeded forthwith to take the needful steps.

Napoleon’s review of the Grand Army before the action opened was destined by the Emperor to encourage his troops and impress his adversaries, who were holding the opposite ridge, only some 1,500 yards away. As the grey – coated figure of their Emperor rode down the serried ranks of his battalions, the enthusiasm of his men burst all bounds, and, in the madness of their adoration of the victor of a hundred fights, and particularly of the victor of Ligny, and Wellington’s pursuer of the day before, they made the welkin resound with their shouts, and from end to end of their close – packed lines rang out the great cry “ Vive l’Empereur!” a cry both calculated to do homage to the god of modern war, and to strike terror into the hearts of all but the boldest of their enemies.

At 11.35 a.m. the great battle opened, and Napoleon directed his first attack against Hougoumont, for this post would enfilade his attacks on the English centre. This, however, was only a side issue.

The French artillery was formed in two large batteries, one of 50 guns directed against Hougumont, the other of 80 guns along the ridge north – east of La Belle Alliance, against the left centre of the allied line. Under cover of this artillery fire and supported by Piré’s cavalry on the left, who demonstrated against the British right, the French left attacked Hougumont, but were repulsed. In the meantime preparations were completed for the attack of the British left centre and left, and Napoleon ordered another effort against Hougoumont to be combined with the attack of the French right wing.

Before launching his attack on the allied left centre, the Emperor cast his eye round, and saw a dense black cloud emerging from the woods of Chapelle St. Lambert.[2] That these were Prussians there was soon no doubt. It was now 1.30 p.m. A prisoner brought in confirmed the fact that this was Bülow’s Corps marching to Wellington’s aid. Napoleon now ordered Lobau’s Corps and the light cavalry to watch Bülow’s advance. He had no idea of ordering a retreat; he was ruined if he failed to beat Wellington that afternoon. But Bülow’s arrival was most inopportune for him, for it reduced by 10,000 men the army destined to overwhelm Wellington. Matters were not fast becoming critical for Napoleon. Would Grouchy act with wisdom and initiative? If he did, all might yet go well. But if he failed to either co – operate early with the Grand Army, or at the least to keep away two of Blücher’s corps from the field of Waterloo, then all was lost. However, Napoleon determined to make what use he could of such time as was allowed him, and to attempt to overthrow the British ere Blücher arrived in force. Ney was, therefore, now ordered to attack the British. Its advance prepared by a hurricane of fire from the Great Battery, D’Erlon’s Corps led the way.

The French left corps was again repulsed at Hougoumont, but their right drove back the Dutch – Belgian Brigade in the left centre of the British first line, and D’Erlon’s Corps engaged Picton’s Division. Whilst the fire fight was raging between Picton’s Division and D’Erlon’s Corps, and the smoke enshrouded the combatants, there opportunely arrived on the scene the Household Cavalry Brigade and the Union Brigade. The latter brigade attacked the flanks of the French columns, the former the French cavalry. The Union Brigade, after overthrowing the French infantry, and drunk with the exhilaration of their success, galloped madly up to the French position and charged the Great Battery. Napoleon, seeing this, hurled on the impetuous and disorganised horsemen cavalry from right and left, and swept them home again with fearful loss. But in the meantime D’Erlon’s great attack had actually melted away; and, more important, the key of the allied position, La Haye Sainte, was still in the hands of its intrepid defenders.

Napoleon, fully realising that he could not draw off now and wait for Grouchy’s arrival, for he would have then been greatly outnumbered by Wellington and Blücher, now resolved to make a fresh attack on the British ere Bülow could engage.

At 3.30 p.m. Ney was ordered to storm La Haye Sainte with the least injured of the regiments of D’Erlon’s Corps. This attack failed. Towards 4 p.m. the cannonade of the allied line became violent in the extreme, and this was the prelude to the charge of 5,000 veteran horsemen composed of Milhaud’s Cuirassiers and the Light Cavalry of the Guard. These squadrons were hurled against the allied infantry squares along the British front between the two farms of La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont: which latter had just again been attacked by the French right.

With the advance of the horsemen a perfect hurricane of fire rent the air. All the British guns, except those of Mercer’s gallant troop, were taken, for, acting on the Duke’s orders, the gunners had retired into the squares after firing the last shot; but ere they did so their last discharge had torn many of the squadrons to pieces. However, the capture was of no avail to the French, for they failed to remove a single piece; nor did they hurl any down into the sunken road, nor even break the sponge staves, nor carry them away, nor even spike the captured guns with their pistol ramrods. The gallant allied infantry held their own, but the French round shot made sad havoc of the squares. Finally Lord Uxbridge hurled fresh squadrons against the Cuirassiers, and the latter gave way.

Napoleon watched the failure of his horsemen to break down the resistance of the allied infantry, and he too was watching the Prussian advance on his right. Ney, on Milhaud being driven back hopelessly disorganised, at 5.30 p.m. called up the rest of the reserve cavalry from the second line. These included Kellerman’s Cuirassiers and the Heavy Cavalry of the Guard, altogether some 9,000 sabres. This splendid body of veteran horsemen now fell upon the crippled squares, and there followed an hour of confused mêlée. Every face of the rapidly dwindling blocks was attacked, but everywhere the horsemen failed to break in. But the stress was great; and Wellington used up all his cavalry save the two brigades on his left wing, and gradually pushed all his reserves forward into the firing line. The squares sustained severe fire, and some even thirteen separate charges – a tribute, sufficient indeed, to their heroic discipline. The feeling of the rank and file is well exemplified by the words of a British sergeant, during the fury of the fight – “We shall see who can kill the longest.”

Finally, failing to break in anywhere, the French horsemen withdrew and again surrendered the plateau.

Meanwhile the French left corps occupied the enclosures of Hougumont, but this post was reinforced by two battalions, whose place on the British right was taken by the Brunswick battalions from the reserve.

The French cavalry charges might well have succeeded had they been immediately followed by infantry. But not until the horsemen had withdrawn were the Bachelu Division and one brigade of the Foy Division (Corps Reille) hurled against the English. Unsupported, they were cut to pieces and forced back.

Meanwhile Blücher with Bülow had, at 4.30 p.m., reached the wood of Paris, only some 3,500 yards from Plancenoit. Wellington kept sending him urgent messages to engage; and Blücher now determined to unmask, and act with those troops that he had in hand. Lobau presented a determined front to this advance; but pressed hard by 30,000 Prussians, his 10,000 gradually gave ground. Disputing every inch, Lobau was pressed back through Plancenoit; but Napoleon, now seeing his line of retreat threatened, reinforced Lobau with Duhesme and the eight battalions of the Young Guard. These fresh troops acted with energy, dislodged the Prussians, and cleared the village. Bülow’s last reserves had now been used up, but he had not so far influenced the fate of the battle. This was hardly the support that Wellington counted on when he offered battle at Mont St. Jean.But fortunately at this crisis the corps of Zieten and Pirch I. drew near.

About this time one of Thielemann’s aides rode up and reported to Blücher that his general was hard pressed at Wavre by superior forces (Grouchy’s 33,000) and he was doubtful if he could hold out. Gneisenau’s answer was – “Let Thielemann defend himself as best he can; it matters little if he is crushed at Wavre, provided we gain the victory here.” Blücher’s Chief of the Staff clearly showed, once more, that he recognised the difference between the essential and the non – essential in war.

Finally, at 6 p.m., the wreck of D’Erlon’s Corps was led against La Haye Sainte. The buildings were nearly in ruins, the ammunition of the gallant defenders was exhausted; and at last the French broke in; but Major Baring and forty – two of the brave garrison cut through their assailants with the bayonet, and regained Mont St. Jean. Wellington now became uneasy, for the critical moment of the battle had undoubtedly arrived. Fortunately for the Allies, Bülow had retaken Plancenoit. The Emperor thereupon sent two battalions of the Middle Guard to recapture the village. These splendid veteran troops closed on the village, on two sides, and, disdaining to fire, turned the Prussians out with the bayonet, and pushed them back a good 600 yards to the east of the village. By one single smashing blow the Emperor had again set his right flank free.

Zieten’s Corps reached Ohain at 6 p.m. At first the General wished to take up a position to support Blücher, but, pressed by Müffling’s urgent entreaties, he commenced to bear down on Wellington’s left.

Napoleon now essayed his last desperate venture, and entrusted five battalions of the Guard to Ney (who by this time had had his fifth horse shot under him) for the last attack on Wellington’s centre. The remains of Reille’s and D’Erlon’s Corps were ordered to support this attack. But the effort came too late. Had the Emperor hurled all the Guard to the front, supported by every available man, to beat in Wellington’s centre directly La Haye Sainte fell, it seems probable that the allied line must have yielded to this tremendous impact of veteran troops. But the delay, and Zieten’s timely support, gave the Duke (who was resolute, vigilant, and prepared for any eventuality throughout the long trying hours of this Sunday afternoon in mid – June) the time to rearrange his line; and by 8 p.m. the last French attack had spent itself, and down their battle – line, from one wing to another, there rang out the dreaded cry – “La Garde recule!” Wellington promptly let loose on the wavering masses in the valley below him his last cavalry reserve, the brigades of Vivian and Vendeleur. At the same moment Zieten irrupted through the right angle at the north – east point of the French front, and the whole army was in a moment transformed into a panic – stricken crowd which fled hastily from the battlefield; and Prussians and English cavalry reached La Belle Alliance together.

Napoleon placed Petit’s two battalions of the 1st Grenadiers of the Guard in squares to stem the retreat and gain time for the army to get away along the road to Genappe. Against these squares of the “Invincibles” all attacks were futile, and in France’s darkest hour the “bearskins” proved worthy of their finest traditions. In good order they finally left the battlefield and followed the army in its retreat.

Meanwhile Lobau had fought sternly around Plancenoit, to save the line of retreat for the Grand Army; not even among those burning ruins on the Danube’s bank in 1809, where he and Masséna had saved another Grand Army from an earlier Waterloo, had he shown more undaunted courage. Lobau’s determination, and the truculent fury with which his men fought, gave time for the Emperor to escape; and thus Lobau preventing his falling into Blücher’s and Gneisenau’s hands undoubtedly saved his masters life.

The French were relentlessly pressed in the pursuit by the Prussians, and, hunted out of seven successive bivouacs, were finally driven over the Sambre, reduced to a mere helpless horde of fugitives.

Meanwhile Grouchy, instead of containing the Prussian army, was himself contained by Thielemann with part of his corps at Wavre.

When at 5 p.m. Grouchy finally received Napoleon’s last dispatch telling him that Bülow had been sighted on the heights of Chapelle St. Lambert, it was already too late for the Marshal to carry out the Emperor’s instructions to turn westward to his aid.

By nightfall on the 18th Grouchy had forced his way across the Dyle in the face of the fine resistance offered by Thielemann despite the large numerical superiority of the French. But, now that the way to Mont St. Jean was at last open, the Emperor’s cannon had long since ceased to be heard. Early on the morrow, the 19th, Grouchy re – engaged and pushed Thielemann gradually back north of Wavre, until at 11 a.m. a message brought him tidings of the magnitude of the disaster at Waterloo; and the Marshal, realising the extreme gravity of his position, and the likelihood of his retreat being intercepted, did not in the immensity of the disaster give way to despair, but arranged a masterly and most successful retreat, and by the energy, decision, and rapidity with which he carried it out, escaped to France, up the Meuse Valley, with his 33,000 men intact.