Part 7

At Ligny, Blücher’s dispositions on the forward slope, neglecting concealment and necessitating the exposure of his supports and reserves, were faulty. Wellington met Blücher on the heights of Bry on the morning of June 16 to concert plans for the future. It is said that when he was shown Blücher’s dispositions and asked his opinion on them, he replied, “He will get damnably mauled.” [1] At this battle Napoleon put into practice his favourite tactical manoeuvre of keeping in hand a strong reserve with which to decide the fight when the issue hung in the balance. This manoeuvre on this occasion, and in fact generally, took the shape of launching the Imperial Guard at the enemy’s centre late in the day. Once a hole in the opposing battle formation had been blown with the “case shot attack” from the massed French batteries, a large body of picked troops, quite fresh, hurled against a line weakened and exhausted by a long day’s fight generally carried all before them. So in this case the Guard, advancing at 7.30 p.m., broke the Prussian centre, and in spite of desperate cavalry charges headed by the gallant but impetuous Blücher himself, decided the issue of the battle. But Napoleon’s misconceptions as to the Prussian strength had cost him dear. True a tactical success had been gained, and the opposing general wounded and all but captured, but at what cost? Very heavy had been the losses, and very great the exhaustion of his men. Worse still, the Prussians defeated were far from routed.

As for Quatre Bras, merely looked at from the tactical point of view, it was undoubtedly a severe check to Ney. But strategically it served Napoleon fairly well, since the Marshal Prince de la Moskowa had prevented Wellington sending off a man to Blücher’s aid all day. On this day, thanks to Bülow’s mistake and Wellington’s deliberation, the Allies put forces into the field forces actually less than Napoleon’s Army. But nevertheless, owing to Napoleon’s reserving Lobau, and particularly on account of D’Erlon’s purposeless wanderings, the French fought with inferior numbers at both points of contact. Blücher undoubtedly suffered defeat owing to Bülow’s absence and Napoleon’s superior tactics. But all the allied mistakes were redeemed by Gneisenau’s bold order for the Prussians to retreat on Wavre. He risked temporary inconvenience to ensure that concentration on a decisive battlefield with Wellington that the Allies had so far missed. This magnificent piece of resolution snatched from Napoleon all the fruits of his tactical success at Ligny; and the danger which that success had momentarily averted was now left impending over him like a cloud that might burst at any moment, and when it did, would surely overwhelm him.

With reference to D’Erlon’s wanderings it would be well now to say a few words. There is no doubt that much of the responsibility for this lack of co- operation is directly traceable to the Emperor. His orders to Ney were not precise enough, for the Marshal was directed to push back the Anglo – Dutch, then wheel up against the Prussian flank and rear. It was not sufficiently explained to Ney that if he merely contained Wellington, with Reille, such action would suffice, for D’Erlon would now be released to carry out the contemplated action.

Again Napoleon practically broke one of his three great maxims, for he attempted to outflank the Prussians with a corps which was really outside his direct control. But having decided on this course he should, directly he had commenced the battle of Ligny, have gone and personally led D’Erlon’s Corps in the attack on Blücher’s right rear; acting in this manner, nothing was left to chance. Soult could quite well have conducted the frontal attack on Blücher. Unfortunately the relations between the Marshal Duke of Dalmatia and the Marshal Prince de la Moskowa were somewhat strained, and it would have been hazardous to entrust Soult with leading D’Erlon’s Corps.[2]

But Ney is not blameless in the matter, for he should have realised that his recall orders to D’Erlon was sent off far too late in the day for the 1st Corps to countermarch and reach Quatre Bras in time to render the Marshal any assistance. D’Erlon was placed on the horns of a dilemma when he received Ney’s order recalling him, but he again should have recognised that he could not reach Quatre Bras before dark; and being then well placed to assist the Emperor, he should at once have fallen on Blücher’s flank. A decisive victory at Ligny would save Marshal Ney from any disastrous consequence even if he had been defeated by Wellington.

The Emperor desired a decision on this day at Ligny, and he failed to get it, for no less than 30,000 of the French army took no part in the day’s fighting. Consequently Blücher was merely pushed back, not destroyed. This day, too, saw practically the last smile the fickle goddess shed on the Emperor. It was a saying of his – “Fortune is a women; remember that when she offers you a chance, because you cannot be certain that she will repeat her offer to –morrow.” Unfortunately for himself he did not act up to this excellent advice, and the chance which fortune offered him of destroying one of his opponents was allowed to escape.

The activity of Wellington and the dilatoriness of Napoleon on the morning of the 17th afford a striking contrast. The former at daybreak reconnoitring personally, collecting sure information and acting accordingly; the latter taking tardy measures to obtain information, and acting on conjecture, thus violating his own maxim that war is not a conjectural art. Not until 8 a.m. were orders issued to Ney; and it was nearly noon ere Grouchy was dispatched with 33,000 men in pursuit of the Prussians. This apparent want of appreciation of the value of time is perhaps the most noticeable feature of the campaign, and no doubt the overwhelming disaster at Waterloo was directly traceable thereto. But Napoleon appreciated the value of time as well as any one, and it is suggested that it was his wrong assumption that Blücher would not leave his communication with Liège, and the consequent false conception based thereon, and also the fact that the situation at Quatre Bras was still obscure, that led Napoleon into waste of valuable time. .But even so, it was necessary to ensure Blücher’s acting in this fashion, and to prevent his force shaking itself together. A relentless pursuit directly after victory should have been commenced. But Napoleon returned to Fleurus for the night without giving any orders for pursuit of the Prussians, and moreover told Grouchy that he would issue his orders on the morrow. This was not the Napoleon of Austerlitz and Jena. After Ligny there was perhaps some necessity for delay. Men are not machines, and the heavy marching and severe fighting had made a short rest imperative. The expenditure both of life and ammunition during the battle had been very severe, and some time was necessary for reorganisation and replenishment. Napoleon assumed that Blücher was in full retreat on Liège: if that were so, the morning of the 17th was a favourable opportunity to permit the much- needed rest, especially as the proposed operations against Wellington would inevitably demand very great exertions from the troops. But the Imperial Guard and Lobau’s Corps were still quite fresh, and had practically no ammunition to make up, and consequently early on the 17th they might have been directed on Quatre Bras, to co – operate with Ney and crush Wellington. Rapid action was a necessity for the Emperor, for in dealing with two opponents, each nearly as strong as himself, there was the ever – present danger that he might get jammed between them and destroyed, as indeed happened on the next day at Waterloo. In suggesting the above move we assume that the Emperor should follow, as indeed he actually did, the analogy of his brilliant campaign of 1814. For in 1815 he threw his concentrated force first upon one opponent, and then upon another, making a brilliant use of their initial mistake in disseminating so widely, and then attempting concentration within his reach; and thus his plan, in 1815, resembled that of 1814. But in both years his brilliant strokes failed to save him. And the following suggestion as an alternative in execution is worth consideration: If in 1814 instead of turning from Blücher on Schwarzenberg, and in 1815, instead of turning from Blücher on to Wellington, what would in each case have happened had the Emperor tried another and immediate blow at Blücher, and followed him until he was destroyed? This might well have changed the course of both campaigns. In each Blücher was the enterprising spirit, and the more irreconcilable adversary. Schwarzenberg, in 1814, was weak and irresolute, and Wellington, in 1815, was, strategically, over – slow and over – cautious. In each case Blücher unaided must have succumbed to the Emperor’s repeated sledge – hammer blows, as he did in 1806. Blows, too, gain in effect by constant and ceaseless repetition. With Blücher destroyed, the whole combination might well have collapsed. Was not 1796 a safer model to follow than 1814?

But to return to the events which actually occurred. Although Napoleon’s delay after Ligny may have been due to both necessity and design, it is far more difficult to explain his neglect in the matter of the pursuit of Blücher’s army. No man knew better than he the value of the pursuit, both tactical and strategical, yet he is found at the crisis of the campaign letting valuable hours slip by, and permitting a beaten foe to withdraw unmolested. The fatigue and exhaustion of the troops have been advanced as the reason for this neglect, but it is scarcely conceivable that he could not have found some means of at any rate keeping touch with his beaten enemy. Napoleon’s whole conduct indicates a calm assurance as to the course Blücher would adopt. But Napoleon here failed to take sufficiently into account the character of Blücher. The latter was dominated by a violent hatred of Napoleon; and Fortune was now offering to the Allies the chance of perhaps crushing the French between the two jaws of a vice. The prospect was too alluring to neglect, and both Blücher and Gneisenau determined to see the matter through despite difficulties and annoyances. One of the secrets of Napoleon’s ill – success in this campaign seems to lie in the foregoing reason; for he had rightly enough appreciated the potent military considerations that would induce a Prussian retreat on Liège, and also the fiery and impetuous features of Blücher’s character that made an early combat at Ligny so probable, but he had not appreciated Blücher’s indomitable resolution, so ably backed by Gneisenau; and the failure to do so, and the failure to keep in close touch with the Prussians, at this critical stage of the campaign, and thus get early and precise news as to their plans, was fatal.

Very different use was made of the morning of the 17th by the Allies. By 8 a.m. Wellington and Blücher, well informed as to their own and the enemies’ dispositions, had their movements for the day well in hand. Blücher’s shattered forces shook themselves together at dawn on June 17. They had withdrawn from the battlefield on the previous night, covered by Thielemann’s Corps, and now fell back on Wavre; and Wellington retired later on Waterloo. A feature of this retirement was Uxbridge’s handling of his cavalry and horse artillery, a useful object – lesson in the combined action of these arms. Grouchy’s wanderings and the scanty information he obtained exemplify the penalties attending the issue of orders instead of instructions to commanders of detachments when the position and intentions of the enemy are doubtful. But Napoleon’s misdirection’s to Grouchy do not excuse the indifferent and negligent scouting of the latter’s cavalry commanders.

Throughout the whole of the operations of June 17 and 18 Grouchy’s conduct is characterised by a want of real resolution. He was in possession of 5,000 cavalry, and with this force, capable of more speedy movement than the other arms, the slow progress of the head of his advance is unaccountable. Above all things, information was required; and for such purpose ample means were provided. A Marshal of France, entrusted with 33,000 men, for a distinct strategic purpose, is supposed to know his duty without instructions that would be required by a subaltern. No doubt the Emperor was under a false impression, but it was Grouchy’s duty to have corrected this.

A question often asked, and about which there has been some controversy, is – “Was Wellington right to stand at Waterloo?” It has been urged that he knew his ally Blücher had practically severed himself from his communications, and that therefore by standing to fight he exposed himself to the risk of defeat, and Blücher to the risk of ruin. Now it is clear that the whole question turns upon the point – Had Wellington sufficiently good reasons to believe that Blücher could and would arrive in time to participate in the battle? If Blücher did so arrive, then the Allies had accomplished that great strategical desideratum of two allied armies on divergent bases, namely, of combining on the battlefield.

Very careful inquiries have been made with respect to the communications that passed between Wellington and Blücher on the 17th; and it is now certain that Wellington and Blücher were in communication, for a Prussian officer reported to Wellington at about 9 a.m. on June 17, having ridden over from Mellery. He had been sent by Gneisenau to inform Wellington of the intended Prussian concentration at Warve, and to inquire what Wellington meant to do. Wellington responded that he would offer a defensive battle on the Mont St. Jean position if he could be supported by at least one of Blücher’s army corps; but if not, he would have to abandon Brussels and retire over the R. Scheldt. The Prussian orderly officer at once returned, with this message, to the Prussian Head – Quarters. When to this is added Blücher’s well – known message received by Wellington at Waterloo at 2 a.m. on the 18th, which ran: “ Bülow’s Corps will set off marching to – morrow in your direction at daybreak. It will be immediately followed by the corps of Pirch I. The 1st and 3rd Corps will also hold themselves in readiness to proceed towards you, The exhaustion of my troops prevents my making any earlier movement,” there can be little doubt that Wellington was sufficiently well informed as to Blücher’s movements and intentions, and that by standing at Waterloo he took no greater risk than is inevitable in all combined operations. Many minor pros and cons on this point have been brought forward by different writers, but most of these ignore the importance of the principle of strategy that aims at the combination on the battlefield of armies operating on divergent lines. Among these other considerations, it is perhaps desirable to mention the political necessity of the defence of Brussels, which, it cannot be denied, could not now, at this stage of the campaign, be attempted elsewhere than on the Mont St. Jean position. Moreover, the capabilities of this position were not unknown to Wellington. He had previously pointed it out as the position he would select for the defence of the Belgian capitol; and therefore his decision to fight at Waterloo was founded on a certain knowledge of the extent of the tactical hazard entailed.