Part 4

Napoleon, having arrived at his decision regarding his initial strategy and its method of execution, puts in practice perhaps the most essential of all the principles of war: - Concentration of all available forces at the decisive point. Seven days sufficed for the almost unsuspected concentration of 125,000 men and 370 guns south of Charleroi, which is in itself a tribute to the genius of the commander and the ability and organisation of his staff. A propos of this concentration it is instructive to notice the particular precautions taken not only to conceal it from the enemy, but to actually mislead him. Napoleon, aware of the extream caution of Wellington’s personal character, thoroughly appreciated how nervous he would be for the safety of his exposed communications with Ostend. He accordingly played upon that nervousness, and by great activity with a few troops on his own extreme left endeavoured to foster the idea that he was concentrating there. Napoleon’s action in this matter is a clear indication of the value he set upon strategical surprise. In fact, throughout his campaigns, it is evident that he regarded the element of surprise as almost essential to success.

The French Army under Napoleon was organised and early in June 1815 disposed as follows (see Plan No. I ) : -

Chief of the Staff – Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia.
1st Corps Drouet, Count d’Erlon – Valenciennes.
2nd   “     Count Reille – Avesnes.
3rd   “      Count Vandamme – Rocroi.
4th   “      Count Gérard – Metz.
6th   “      Mouton, Count Lobau – Laon.
Imperial Guard – Paris.
Cavalry Reserve, Marshal Count Grouchy – Guise.

Marshal Ney, Prince de la Moskowa, was also available for high command in the Grand Army.

The army, although too small for the purpose, was the finest Napoleon had commanded since Friedland. It was entirely French, and composed almost solely of veterans. But there was a general want of discipline in it, much actual disloyalty, and a widespread feeling of insecurity.

Such an army can only achieve something through its leader, never by itself. For the real spirit of an army must never be confused with its temper. But what makes men readily obey orders that involve the endurance of danger, hunger and fatigue is the habit of obedience. Without this ingrained habit an army is knit together by really fragile bonds, and is liable to sudden panic. Discipline is the only thing that can save an army at the end of a lost battle; by its aid men instinctively cling together, for they realise that in concentration alone can any security be found. Armies which lack discipline, when defeat stares them in the face, break up into flying mobs of played – out rubbish and drift away from the battlefield impossible to rally, and incapable of further effort. As war is the playground of fortune, and every battle cannot be a victory, so every army needs discipline to enable it to survive something more than the mere shock of combat. As the late Colonel Henderson has written, “obedience is not an instinct, and good – will is but an ineffective substitute for the machine – like subordination of a well – disciplined regular.”

Although all the rank and file of the Grand Army started for the frontier in a state of fierce enthusiasm, and one and all were fanatical adherents of Napoleon’s, yet many of the senior officers took the field with a presentiment of disaster, and a vision of the hangman’s rope ever before their eyes in case of a defeat. And although no army that the Emperor ever commanded fought with such truculent fury as that of 1815, yet the frame of mind of those senior officers who were already fatally compromised with Louis XVIII., although it might nerve them to acts of desperate courage, yet it could not assuredly strengthen their judgment in the hour of need. Never before had Napoleon handled an instrument of war at once so formidable and so fragile.

Secretly, stealthily, and very skilfully the French concentrated south of the R. Sambre was carried out; and on June 14, when the Emperor had massed his united force between Charleroi and Beaumont and was ready to deal his adversaries a staggering blow, the Allies were still widely scattered along the frontier from Ath to Liège.

It would take six days to concentrate the allied force on either flank, and three days for the Allies to draw together onto a central line. It was essential to Napoleon therefore to gain a three days’ start on the Allies, or they would draw together and be ready for him; and to meet them united would be almost certainly fatal, for they outnumbered him in a proportion of nearly two to one. He practically staked his Empire, therefore, on gaining the three days’ start which was necessary in order to defeat the Allies in detail, or catch them flagrant délit of concentration.

It will perhaps not be out of place to give here a brief narrative of the events of the campaign. Taking as a starting point June 14, 1815, the situation was –

Allies Prussians - 1st Corps, Head - quarters Charleroi. 2nd Corps, Head – quarters Namur. 3rd Corps, Head – quarters Ciney. 4th Corps, Head - quarters Liège English- 1st Corps, Quatre Bras to Enghien.  2nd Corps, west of Enghien to the R. Scheldt. Reserve, Brussels. Dutch – Belgian Cavalry on the Sambre. Heavy Cavalry, Grammont – Ninove.

French French- Left Wing, 45,000, north of Beaumont. Centre, 64,000, north – east of Beaumont,  Right Wing, 16,000,

Thus within ten days nearly 125,000 Frenchmen, separated by distances varying from 25 to 175 miles, had assembled on the frontier and were within easy cannon range of the enemy’s advanced posts, before the Allies had taken a single defensive measure. The ground covered by the bivouacs of the French army on this date did not exceed twenty miles in breath by six miles in depth.

In contradistinction to the Emperor’s concentrated forces the English and Prussians were still scattered along a front line extending over one hundred miles, and with an average depth of fifty miles.

June 15

Allies Prussians - 1st Corps, - concentrated on the line St Amand-Ligny. 2nd Corps, marched on Mazy. 3rd Corps, reached Namur. 4th Corps, not realising the urgency of the case, did not move. English- Orders for concentration at Nivelles were issued. The divisions concentrated – 1st Corps, Ath. 2nd Corps, Braine – le – Comte. 4th Corps Grammont. Reserve, Brussels. 2nd & 3rd Dutch – Belgian Nivelles. 1st Dutch-Belgian and Indian Brigade, Sottegem. Cavalry, Ninove.

French French- Left Wing, (Ney) moved by Thuin and Marchienne and halted with its head at Frasnes and rear at Marchienne.  Centre Column, having crossed the Sambre at Charleroi, was in touch with the Prussian 1st Corps, but nearly half was still south of the Sambre. Right Column, halted astride the Sambre at Chatelet, its leading division at Gilly.  (Napoleon commanded the Centre and Right columns in person) Ney had reported to the Emperor at Charleroi a little after 3 p.m., and had been given the command of the Left Wing.

Napoleon’s movements on this day clearly show that his object on June 15 was to reach the Namur road at Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, thus completly dividing the Allies on the only road by which they could unite. At the close of the day Napoleon was actually the master of the whole of the ground on which the Anglo – Dutch array were to have met him, and his advance guard had made good part of that marked out for Blücher.

Blücher had one corps on the intended ground; two others near; but the fourth was still far distant.

In halting Reille’s Corps at Gosselies, Ney for the first time in his military career yielded to motives of prudence. But his action was most unwise. As for Wellington, he had not moved a man to meet the enemy; and his concentration,  as he ordered it, left the Charleroi – Brussels road practically open for Ney’s advance, save for those few Dutch – Belgians who had concentrated at Quatre Bras without orders. The Duke clearly under – estimated the rapidity with which Napoleon would strike when his Empire was at stake. It may truthfully be asserted that up to this time the balance of strategy was on the Emperor’s side.

For the game was already won. It needed now only a continuation of that unsurpassed energy which had led Napoleon’s battalions to the frontier, and a moderate loyalty and intelligence on the part of his lieutenants, to place the crown upon strategy. In all the years from 1796 to 1815 his opponents had not learnt the secret, now so patent, of Napoleon’s unrivalled success. Those students who are familiar with the Napoleonic campaigns will here say to themselves:  “As at Montenotte, and at Marengo, and at Jena, Napoleon has once more won a campaign by a single stroke – the first stroke, the only stroke that counts. Henceforth nothing but ordinary energy and industry are required. His mass of men is there, ready to crack in twain the scattered hosts of the Allies. The wedge is fast; the succeeding strokes will come, quick and true. Nothing can save the Allies. The game is already won.”