Part 2

The dispositions in detail of the Allies in early June were:-

It will be noticed that Wellington’s was a very miscellaneous array, comprising as it did British, King’s German Legion, Hanoverians, Brunswickers and, weakest link of all, the Dutch-Belgians. Blücher’s was a far more homogeneous force, and contained a good proportion of veteran Prussian regiments.

These scattered dispositions of the allied forces in Belgium have often been made the subject of unfavourable comment. No doubt this disposition was strategically unsound, but it is possible that it was forced upon the allied commanders by the difficulties experienced in supplying their armies. Taking into consideration the strongly French tendencies of many Belgians, it was clearly important to deny Brussels to Napoleon. Consequently, from a purely strategical point of view, probably the best course for the Allies would have been concentration about Waterloo, with cavalry and advanced troops watching the frontier. But the widely divergent bases of the Allies forced upon them a more advanced position, and it only remained for them to make the best possible preparation for rapid concentration and to avoid being surprised during the process of concentration. Should Napoleon advance he would certainly do so on one line, and the campaign would be a struggle between a single line and divergent lines of communication. In those days the means of intercommunication were so restricted that the preponderance of advantage lay with the single line, but the double line had, and has still, the great advantage that if the two armies can manage to combine on the battlefield the blow delivered is generally decisive. The facilities for intercommunication that now exist will remove many of the disabilities from armies acting on double lines, but the great advantage will remain. Fifty years later this was exemplified at Koniggrätz in 1866, and the detrainment of Smith’s brigade of the Valley Army on the battlefield of First Manassas in 1861 may be regarded as another example.

But, as von Goltz says, whether the point of concentration for units of the army should be selected according to the one principle or the other, must be left for the practiced eye to discern from the situation, which is different on every occasion. It must, however, always be borne in mind that the object aimed at is not to seek the point of concentration according to the one method or the other by any hard – and – fast rules, but rather to accomplish one of the great ends of strategy, namely, to bring all the troops on the battlefield so as to ensure their combined action. Each system responds to a distinct preceding state of affairs, and is not of arbitrary application. Further, although the divided advance generally promises greater success, for it leads to the development of the enemy on the battlefield, yet the advance in mass affords greater security against disaster; and he who is at a loss what to do should use it. To – day the attacker undoubtedly enjoys the advantage of single – handed leading, as against a divided command, in which two commanders have to arrange their joint action by means of telegraph or in writing. This becomes difficult the more the attack comes as a surprise, or becomes critical, i.e. the more rapidly and energetically the other side acts. The point of contact of two independent armies will, as heretofore, be the objective for strategical penetration.

Two courses were open to Napoleon: -

1. To stand on the defensive, manoeuvring to gain time and augment his numbers.
2. To seize the initiative, assume the offensive, and, by a most vigorous onslaught on the most exposed of his foes, deal the Coalition a heavy blow.

With regard to these two possible courses, it will be admitted that when one belligerent is numerically greatly inferior to the other and he elects to concentrate and await attack, the inevitable result is that his opponents also and he finds himself inferior at the decisive point. But of the 645,000 entering France, 150,000 would have to be left to guard the communications and mask fortresses; and 75,000 were required for subsidiary operations. Thus the vast host ere it reached the Seine would have dwindled to 420,000. Against this array Napoleon could oppose 200,000 and the entrenched camp of Paris. He would repeat 1814, but with more than double the numbers he then had, and Paris to act as a strong pivot of manoeuvre and commanded by Davout, who could be reckoned on to the last extremity, as he had already proved at Austerlitz, Auerstädt, Eckmühl and Hamburg. On the other hand, Napoleon might by adopting a vigorous offensive so skilfully manoeuvre as to catch the enemy in the very act of concentration and be superior at the point of contact. On these grounds, therefore, the course first suggested should be rejected. No doubt these reasons in themselves would have been sufficient to induce Napoleon to adopt the second course, but in this case political considerations, the objections to leaving a third of his territory defenceless and to waging war in his own country, and the doubtful temper of the French people at that time, were not unimportant factors in the problem before him.

Again, the second plan was bolder, more worthy of his genius, and of the temperament of the French Army. Napoleon weighed these schemes carefully, and finally came to the conclusion that he would adopt the offensive.