WATERLOO – Part 1

The campaign of Waterloo is so well known, and the accounts and criticism so numerous, that it is not proposed here to do more than give a brief outline of its principle incidents with a view to deducing there from some of the more important lessons that they convey. The Emperor had returned to France with the “violets in the spring” of 1815. Reaching Paris on March 20, he at once reconstructed the official machinery of the Empire, and set about reconstituting and raising as numerous an army as possible in such time as the Allies left him before they struck. His position was very different from that of former years, for in 1815 he had no ally; and it was long before he dared let fall the odious word “conscription,” for Louis XVIII’s most popular act had been its abolition.

By the end of May 1815 Napoleon found the whole of Europe in arms against him. By strenuous exertions he was able to place 200,000 men in the field, but, as he himself admits, 800,000 would have been required to oppose the allied forces once they effected concentration.  By October 1 the Emperor reckoned he would have 800,000 men under arms, and with such numbers massed around the eagles anything might be possible. But the Allies did not give him the necessary time to make himself secure. The situation at this time was:-

Wellington, based on Ostend viâ Ghent with a possible alternative base at Antwerp, 93,000 of various nationalities, holding from the rivers Lys and Scheldt to the Brussels-Charleroi road.

Blücher, based on Cologne, viâ Liège, 116,000 Prussians, from the Brussels-Charleroi road to Namur, Liège and Ciney (see Plan 1)

Heavy Russian columns (150,000 strong under Barclay de Tolly) and 210,000 Austrians under Schwarzenberg were advancing on France, but as yet still far distant.

The Army of Upper Italy (48,000 Austrians and Piedmontese) and the Austrian army of Naples (25,000 strong) were to pass the Alps and advance on Lyons and Provence. The English Mediterranean Squadron was destined to co-operate in these operations.

To oppose these vast hosts Napoleon had 200,000 men between Paris and the Belgian frontier.

Wellington might concentrated his forces and with Blücher advance on Paris; but political reasons, combined with the safe strategical course of awaiting his powerful Allies, imposed upon them the adoption of defensive strategy.