Fighting as well as farming.

At the battle of Näfels (9^th April 1388) the Swiss once again took advantage of the letzinen. These protective barriers were used to good effect both on the defensive and the offensive. By allowing the Austrians to penetrate the palisaded earthworks by a tactical withdrawal to higher ground, the Swiss contingent from Glarus were able to defeat them when, instead of pressing on and keeping up the pressure, the Austrians began to loot the village and surrounding farms. Taking advantage of this, and a heavy mist which had descended, the Glarus men counterattacked charging the now scattered, and we may imagine undisciplined Austrians, with showers of arrows and stones and causing them to disperse in total disorder. The engagements at Voegelinsegg (15^th May 1403) and Stoss (17^th June 1405) also show how the letzinen was used to their advantage by the Swiss, who once again allowed the enemy to penetrate their defences and then attacked  their exposed flanks as they passed through. Delbrück informs us that particular mention is made of the hail of stones used by the Appenzellers during their attack in the sources for the latter engagement.[1] This stone throwing causes a problem. On a recent visit to Switzerland I enquired about the method used in throwing stones; were they just small hand held pebbles thrown en mass, or were sling-shots used? The general consensus of opinion was that they were hand thrown. Following this up I decided to try out the effectiveness of this method by arranging various groupings of grass and straw dummies, some with fabric covering, others with improvised “armour” made from old sheet metal and flattened-out tin cans. The “missiles” came in various sizes from small 30 – 50 gram pebbles, up to 1 kilogram rocks, the latter proving not only difficult to throw any distance but also very tiring to the arm after four or five casts. The smaller stones could be propelled a distance of around 20-30 meters, but the damage caused was negligible unless a direct hit was scored onto the face. With this being said I consider that, although several hundred stones thrown by hand would have had a demoralizing effect on the enemy, the actual harm they caused was not substantial, other than to horses.

In 1419 the cantons of Unterwalden and Uri turned their attention to the Milanese city of Bellinzona, which controlled several main alpine passes, and although not able to force its capitulation they remained a constant threat to the city. For her part Milan offered to sell the city to the belligerent Swiss but the offer was declined and thereafter in 1422 the mercenary condottieri, Francesco Bussone da Carmagnola, received orders from the Duke of Milan to evict the troublesome Swiss. On the 30^th June 1422 Carmagnola, at the head of an army estimated to be over 14,000 strong attacked the Confederates, who numbered around 2,500 men, in their camp at Arbedo. The Swiss were quick to react, and soon formed themselves into square formation and repelled several attacks by Carmagnola’s mounted troops. Realizing the futility of further assaults by his knights the Milanese commander ordered them to dismount and form with his foot soldiers for an all out attack. Unable to deal with the masses sent against them the Swiss began a slow withdrawal, which however would eventually have proved futile given the numbers being thrown against them. Just as all seemed lost a contingent of 600 Swiss foragers arrived on the field allowing the badly mauled Confederate square to cut its way through and make good its escape to the north with the loss of 800 killed and wounded.

Swiss battlefield formation. (US Air War College)

As Douglas Miller states:

Arbedo marks a watershed in Swiss military history, for it forced the Confederation to reconsider the effectiveness of the halberd as the principle staff weapon. More than anything else Arbedo drove home the need to equip [all] the Confederate foot soldier with the pike. Shortly after the battle this need was acknowledged at a Diet held in Lucerne and instructions were given to increase the proportion of pikemen in the cantonal contingents.

This decision was to herald the second great period of Swiss military supremacy, for the introduction of the pike as a principle infantry weapon was to revolutionize military thinking and practice. Due to its length the pike could not be handled individually to any great effect, but had to be employed “en mass.” The proper collective handling of the pike would of necessity entail a considerable amount of training. Furthermore, the introduction of the pike meant the subordination of other weapons, if not in numerical terms then certainly in their mode of employment. Thus while the pike gradually became adopted as the main weapon, the halberd was retained to guard the banners together with the two – handed swordsmen and the axe – bearers. However, if a column was halted and the pike locked with the enemy’s front, then the halberdiers and swords – men could always issue from the sides and rear of the column to break the deadlock.[2]

The adoption of the pike was one thing, but in matters of discipline and control the Swiss still had a few lessons to learn. The test came in 1444 when King Charles VII of France allied himself with the Habsburgs and sent an army of over 15,000 men into Swiss territory. The resulting encounter at St Jacob-en-Birs (26^th August) saw a small Confederate reconnaissance force of 1,000 men go totally out of control, refusing to obey orders and locking horns for four hours with the whole enemy army. The outcome was predictable, and the Swiss died to a man, but not before taking over 2,000 of their enemy with them. As Delbrück tells us:

The linking with the civil authorities gave the Swiss general levies the basis of military obedience. Despite the authority of the feudal lord or mercenary leader, in the knightly armies the habit of obedience was still very weak. The reason was that this type of warriorhood was based completely on personal skill, bravery, and love of glory, and there was hardly any question of leadership in combat. Even though the Swiss might have been just as brutal on the march or in camp or while plundering as were the mercenary bands of the period, in battle in their closed units, they followed the command, and in dangerous situations their obligation to obey was stressed with special formality... Anyone who fled or cried out for flight was subject to the judge for both his person and his property, or he could be struck down on the spot by his flanking comrade.[3]

It should also have become glaringly obvious that berserker tactics, coupled with the outright disregard of obeying direct orders issued by a commander on the battlefield , must be addressed; a problem that the Swiss would later regret not having rectified.