The French Army

Being humiliated both politically and diplomatically after the collapse of Austria in 1866, the French had not become complacent with regard to their own military position, and fully realised that they may soon have to confront the Prussians in a stand up fight. Noting the fact that her professional army would be too small to confront the might of a much-enlarged Prussia, Napoleon had authorised Marshal Neil to raise the strength of the French forces from its mobilisation figure of 290,000 (in 1866) to at least 1,000,000 but: ‘The many schemes produced during the next eighteen months, including the one finally passed in January 1868 by an increasingly intransigent Corps Législatif, aimed at a front-line army on mobilisation of some 800,000 men, with a trained National Guard of at least 400,000 in reserve. Honestly implemented. This would have more than met Napoleon’s requirements. By 1875 France would have had a regular army of 800,000 on mobilisation, consisting of men who had served five years with the colours and four on permanent leave. This part of the programme, which would entail no increase of the annual contingent, was running smoothly with complete success when war came-five years too soon-in 1870.’[1]

Things were still not altogether desperate, but with the death of Marshal Niel in August 1869, his post was filled by the competent, if less politically adroit, General Edmond Lebœuf, who coming under pressure from the Legislature was forced to make drastic cut backs in expenditure. However, by the summer of 1870 Lebœuf had available for active service almost 500,000 troops, which would give him, upon mobilisation, 300,000 men in three weeks.[2] With their new infantry rifle, the chassepot, and their much-prized “secret weapon,” the Mitrailleuse, the French “appeared” ready to give the Prussians another lesson in Napoleonic warfare: ‘It was the tragedy of the French army, and of the French nation, that they did not realise in time that military organisation had entered into an entirely new age.’[3]

The French war plans were, to say the least, half-cocked and half-baked. Fully understanding that he would be outnumbered by the Prussians, Napoleon had decided to take the offensive before his own mobilisation was complete by a swift attack towards the east, hoping that he would be able to cause the South German States to reconsider their alliance with Prussia, but also win over the Austrians into entering the war on the side of France. To this end the French army was initially to be assembled with 150,000 men at Metz, 100,000 at Strasbourg, and a further 50,000 at Châlons. The first two armies would advance and unite before crossing the Rhine, and thereafter move rapidly into South Germany hoping to force those states into declaring their neutrality. After this the French would join with Austria and move on Berlin, while at the same time the French fleet would sail to threaten the Elbe River and the Baltic coast.[4]

Marshal Patrice MacMahone  (Walker collection)

The only problem with this, what appeared to be a very feasible plan of operation, was that France were unable to cope with the immense logistical problems (most of her own creation) that were entailed in putting it into action: “In the supply depôts no camp-kettles, dishes and stoves; no canteens for the ambulances and no pack-saddles; in short no ambulances either for the divisions and corps. Up to the 7^th (August) it was all but impossible to obtain a mule- litter for the wounded. That day thousands of wounded men were left in the hands of the enemy; no preparations had been made to get them away…If for four days our soldiers lived on the charity of the inhabitants, if our roads are littered with straggles dying of hunger, it is the administration which is to blame.”[5]

This total confusion within the French administration, and the fact that Austria had also backed down from giving her support, caused a new plan to be hatched. On the 18^th July the 4^th Corps (Ladmirault); 2^nd Corps (Frossard) and the 3^rd Corps (Bazaine, who was in provisional command of the army until Napoleon arrived) were covering the area from Metz to the frontier. To the South, Marshal MacMahon with the 1st Corps was concentrating around Strasbourg. The 5^th Corps under General Failly was stationed in and around Sarreguemines and Bitche where they formed a link between Metz and Strasbourg. The Imperial Guard (Bourbaki) was at Nancy, while the 7^th Corps (Felix Douay) was forming around Belfort. On the 23^rd July General Leboeuf, who was now on his way to join the army with the post of Chief-of-Staff to Napoleon, ordered a tighter grouping to the North, and to this end the Imperial Guard moved to Metz, while the 5^th Corps moved closer to the left. While all this shuffling was taking place, Marshal Canrobert began to assemble the 6^th Corps at Châlons. On 28^th July Napoleon arrived at Metz to take command of the army.