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Introduction
The Road To War
The French Army
The Prussians
First Encounters
The Battlefield
The Battle
Bibliography

 

 

 

The Road to War.


The Emperor Napoleon III
(Franz Xavier Winterhalter)
The British Ambassador to France, Lord Lyons noted in 1867 that, ‘The discontent is great and the distress among the working classes severe. There is no glitter at home or abroad to divert public attention, and the French have spent many years without the excitement of a change.’ In 1868 he went on to say, ‘Probably the wisest thing he (Napoleon III) could do would be to allow real Parliamentary government so as to give the Opposition hope of coming into office by less violent means than a revolution.’[1]

The Prussian victory over Austria at the Battle of Königgrätz (July 3rd 1866) had come not only as a blow, albeit as it turned out a kid-gloved one, to Austrian hegemony within the smaller German states, but the wind change that followed caused France to be rocked on her heels. Suddenly finding her own position within Europe challenged, the Emperor Napoleon III sought immediate guarantees of compensation in Belgium and on the left bank of the Rhine River, demands that were totally rejected by the Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck.[2] Napoleon himself was in poor health, suffering from bladder stones and lethargy. At times he could neither walk nor sleep, which so weakened him physically that his judgment and statesmanship were brought into question.[3]  These problems, and the growing unrest within France, came to a head when a situation occurred that was in no way a precursor to war, and which should not even have been contemplated as an excuse for starting one.

 
Otto von Bismarck.
After the overthrow of Queen Isabella in 1868, the Spanish were casting around for a new monarch. During the summer of 1870 the throne was offered to the hereditary Prince of Hohenzollen-Sigmaringen, Leopold, whose brother Charles had recently accepted the crown of Rumania.

Under constant pressure from the Spanish President of the Council of Ministers, Marshal Prim, Leopold was showing no signs that he was enthusiastic about the proposal. Prim, who was secretly supported by Bismarck, next turned his attention on the Prussian King, William I, whom he hoped would help persuade Leopold to accept the offer. William himself was cool towards the idea, as he considered that the throne of Spain was, to say the least, precarious. Bismarck, who saw the possibilities of both military and commercial benefits being reaped once a Hohenzollen was firmly seated across the Pyrenees, entertained no such thoughts and began to talk Leopold’s father, Charles Antony, around into putting pressure on his son to take the job. Finally Leopold caved-in and, still somewhat reluctantly, accepted. 

 
Marshal François Achille Bazaine 
(Jean Adolphe Beauce)
As might be expected, the prospect of being placed between two Hohenzollen monarchs as in the jaws of a vice did not go down too well in France. Immediately outraged diplomatic outpourings began to be fired at poor Leopold who was only too happy to withdraw from the candidature, as he had no wish in creating an incident, and on 19th June 1870 he informed King William of his decision, and there it could have ended. However Napoleon still choose to recklessly press the issue by sending his Ambassador to the small spa town of Bad Ems where the Prussian monarch was taking the waters, with instructions to obtain a promise from William that Leopold would decline the offer were it to be renewed. William replied that he now considered the matter closed, but the French Ambassador, Benedetti asked for a second audience with the king in order to clear up some details, which William courteously declined stating that he had nothing more to say.[4] The famous “Ems Telegram” therefore contained no more than William’s refusal of further French demands concerning the candidacy of the Spanish crown. Bismarck was to claim in later life that he had edited the telegram to make it less conciliatory, but it is now clear that this is untrue and that the telegram had little influence on the decisions being taken in Paris. Not a single word of the telegram was altered, but it was abridged in such a way that it appeared as a slap in the face to the French, a fact that was compounded by it being circulated around Europe. As to the matter of Bismarck engineering the war the simple answer is probably that he was well aware of the risk involved, and was prepared to run it; that he believed the French had won the diplomatic contest is also true, but he was finally both surprised and relieved when they, at 11.20 a.m. on 19th July 1870, blundered into declaring war.[5]

 

Next


[1] Quoted in Gooch. G.P, The Second Empire, page 28-29.

[2] Howard. Michael, The Franco Prussian War, page 40.

[3] Gooch. G.P, The Second Empire, page 29.

[4] Gooch. G.P, The Second Empire, page 30

[5] See the discussion concerning the telegram in, Conflict and Stability in the Development of Modern Europe, 1789-1970, Open University Press 1980.

 

 

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