The Road to War.

The Emperor Napoleon III
(Franz Xavier Winterhalter) |
The British Ambassador to France, Lord Lyons noted in 1867 that,
‘The discontent is great and the distress among the working classes
severe. There is no glitter at home or abroad to divert public
attention, and the French have spent many years without the excitement
of a change.’ In 1868 he went on to say, ‘Probably the wisest
thing he (Napoleon III) could do would be to allow real Parliamentary
government so as to give the Opposition hope of coming into office by
less violent means than a revolution.’
[1]
The Prussian victory over Austria at the Battle of Königgrätz
(July 3rd 1866) had come not only as a blow, albeit as it
turned out a kid-gloved one, to Austrian hegemony within the smaller
German states, but the wind change that followed caused France to be
rocked on her heels. Suddenly finding her own position within Europe
challenged, the Emperor Napoleon III sought immediate guarantees of
compensation in Belgium and on the left bank of the Rhine River,
demands that were totally rejected by the Prussian chancellor Otto von
Bismarck.[2] Napoleon
himself was in poor health, suffering from bladder stones and
lethargy. At times he could neither walk nor sleep, which so weakened
him physically that his judgment and statesmanship were brought into
question.[3] These
problems, and the growing unrest within France, came to a head when a
situation occurred that was in no way a precursor to war, and which
should not even have been contemplated as an excuse for starting one.
Otto von Bismarck. |
After the overthrow of Queen Isabella in 1868, the Spanish were
casting around for a new monarch. During the summer of 1870 the throne
was offered to the hereditary Prince of Hohenzollen-Sigmaringen,
Leopold, whose brother Charles had recently accepted the crown of
Rumania.
Under constant pressure from the Spanish President of the Council
of Ministers, Marshal Prim, Leopold was showing no signs that he was
enthusiastic about the proposal. Prim, who was secretly supported by
Bismarck, next turned his attention on the Prussian King, William I,
whom he hoped would help persuade Leopold to accept the offer. William
himself was cool towards the idea, as he considered that the throne of
Spain was, to say the least, precarious. Bismarck, who saw the
possibilities of both military and commercial benefits being reaped
once a Hohenzollen was firmly seated across the Pyrenees, entertained
no such thoughts and began to talk Leopold’s father, Charles Antony,
around into putting pressure on his son to take the job. Finally
Leopold caved-in and, still somewhat reluctantly, accepted.
Marshal François Achille Bazaine
(Jean Adolphe Beauce) |
As might be expected, the prospect of being placed between two
Hohenzollen monarchs as in the jaws of a vice did not go down too well
in France. Immediately outraged diplomatic outpourings began to be
fired at poor Leopold who was only too happy to withdraw from the
candidature, as he had no wish in creating an incident, and on 19
th
June 1870 he informed King William of his decision, and there it could
have ended. However Napoleon still choose to recklessly press the
issue by sending his Ambassador to the small spa town of Bad Ems where
the Prussian monarch was taking the waters, with instructions to
obtain a promise from William that Leopold would decline the offer
were it to be renewed. William replied that he now considered the
matter closed, but the French Ambassador, Benedetti asked for a second
audience with the king in order to clear up some details, which
William courteously declined stating that he had nothing more to say.
[4]
The famous “Ems Telegram” therefore contained no more than William’s
refusal of further French demands concerning the candidacy of the
Spanish crown. Bismarck was to claim in later life that he had edited
the telegram to make it less conciliatory, but it is now clear that
this is untrue and that the telegram had little influence on the
decisions being taken in Paris. Not a single word of the telegram was
altered, but it was abridged in such a way that it appeared as a slap
in the face to the French, a fact that was compounded by it being
circulated around Europe. As to the matter of Bismarck engineering the
war the simple answer is probably that he was well aware of the risk
involved, and was prepared to run it; that he believed the French had
won the diplomatic contest is also true, but he was finally both
surprised and relieved when they, at 11.20 a.m. on 19
th
July 1870, blundered into declaring war.
[5]