The Campaign Against Russia.

With two of his antagonists now out of the fight Charles bent all his efforts in building up his armies for the confrontation with the Russian Tsar that he now so much desired. Military preparations were set in motion and new recruits flooded into the Swedish ranks, whose numbers had now risen to over 30,000. Besides these almost 11,000 fresh troops from Sweden were mustering in Swedish Pomerania and would join the main army when it entered Poland, while a further 12,500 under Lewenhaupt were at Riga, and 14,000 more under Lybecker in Finland awaited orders to strike at St Petersburg; the whole army numbered almost 70,000 men, and although Peter would be able to oppose them with some 110,000, Charles was content that he could deal with any army the Russians could send against him.[i] On 27^th August 1707 Charles quit his headquarters at Altranstädt and rode into Dresden to pay a last visit to his first cousin Augustus, who now had to be content with the much-diminished title of Elector of Saxony. Thereafter he joined his forward units as they crossed into Protestant Silesia - there would be no turning back.

The bright sunlit roads and pleasant villages of Saxony and Silesia soon gave way to devastated farms and fields as the Swedish army entered Poland. The town of Rawicz had been burned to the ground, and the countryside for miles around turned into a wasteland by bands of Cossack and Kalmuck horsemen. Halting his army at Posen Charles ordered a strong fortified camp to be built. Here he would spend the next two months drilling his troops while he waited for the autumn rains to subside and the first frost to harden the waterlogged roads.

Breaking camp on 26^th November the Swedes marched fifty miles from Polsen to the Vistula River, having to spend another month of frustration waiting for ice to form on the river so that a crossing could be made. Then, on Christmas Day 1707 the temperature plummeted and the surface water began to freeze over. Planks and straw were dowsed with water and pushed onto the ice for added strength, enabling the wagons and artillery to pass over with only a minimal loss of life and material.[ii]

Charles, as was his wont, chose the most difficult route eastward, through the Masovian forests, an area so inhospitable that it had never before been used by an army. By doing so he hoped to turn the Russian position on the River Narew.[iii] After a ten-day march during which the Swedes killed, tortured and devastated the Masrovian population and its villages, they finally emerged on the plains of Lithuania. By 28^th January 1708 Charles, with only an escort of 600 men, crossed over the River Niemen and entered Grodno, the Russian garrison having evacuated the town only hours before.[iv] Pressing relentless onward the Swedes entered Smorgonie, then turned southeast to Radoszkowicze where, fully realizing that the Russians could keep falling back, and that his own troops were in need of rest, Charles ordered a camp to be built and the country scoured for food and fodder.

Before the commencement of the summer campaign Charles ordered Lewenhaupt’s 12,500 men to march from Courland with a massive supply train and join the main army. The 14,000 Swedish troops under Lybecker had also received orders to advance from Finland and threaten St Petersburg. The Swedish monarch was now faced with two choices, either to continue to follow the Russian army, or to recapture the Baltic provinces lost during his campaigning in Poland. Naturally, given his character, Charles decided that he must finish-off his business with the Russian Tsar first, and thus he choose to plunge on regardless of numbers, time and distance. As Robert Frost tells us, ‘ Charles would have been naïve to believe that Peter would be content with the cession of St Petersburg alone; it was the Russians who would benefit most from a suspension of hostilities. The only way to secure a lasting peace and long-term security for the Baltic provinces was to destroy the Russian army and force Peter to settle on Swedish terms. An invasion of Russia was the only way to achieve that end.’[v]

Breaking camp on 6^th June the Swedish army marched towards Borisov on the River Berezina where some 8,000 Russians under General Goltz were well dug-in and prepared to contest the crossing, and once again Charles completely confounded his opponent by marching south and crossing the river at Berezina-Sapezhinskaya, turning the Russian position and making another defensive river line untenable to the Russians.  After this event it was decided that battle must be offered to the Swedes before they managed to cross the River Dnieper, however it was not to be a ‘…risk-everything, life-or-death battle, but a battle that would extract payment from the invaders’. [vi]

The Russians took up a position behind the muddy river Babich, across from the town of Golovchin, their lines extending along the riverbank for almost six miles. On the 30^th June Charles himself arrived at Golovchin where he was forced to wait for several days until the bulk of his army arrived. After reconnoitring the Russian position Charles noted that the river was fordable and considered that, even with the enemy well entrenched on the far side, their position was so extended as a result of not wishing to allow the Swedes another opportunity of a turning move that it would be possible to break through by direct assault. With his keen eye for topography the Swedish monarch had noticed that the Russian line was divided into two separate portions, separated at the centre by a wooded and boggy area of terrain through which meandered a small stream feeding into the Babich.[vii]

 
Russian infantry

At dawn on the 4^th July all was ready and 7,000 Swedish infantry began wading the river, taking the Russians by complete surprise. Climbing the opposite bank they continued their advance in a slow deliberate fashion. Perplexed and confounded by this surprise attack the Russian commander, General Nikita Repnin* ordered up cavalry to attack the Swedish in flank. Fortunately Rehnskjold was at hand with the Swedish Guard cavalry, and these, together with fresh regiments sent across the river forced the Russians to retire. Seeing their cavalry defeated, and now coming under even more pressure as fresh Swedish infantry crossed the river, the Russian infantry on their left flank crumpled and fell back, abandoning their artillery and baggage. At 8 a.m. Charles was ready to turn his attention to the Russian right wing, which had however already begun to retreat towards the River Dnieper.

Despite their defeat and retreat the Russians had fought well, proof that they had gained much in experience and discipline since Narva. Charles however still considered them inferior and held them in contempt, and this was to be the cause of much of his woes. To underestimate one’s enemy, even after defeating him in battle should never be contemplated by even the most brilliant of commands.

On 9^th July the Swedish army reached Mogilev on the River Dnieper, the front doorstep of Russia, but to the surprise of the Russian scouts across the river Charles remained firmly on the opposite side. Here until 5^th August the 35,000 men of the Swedish army marked time, awaiting the arrival of Count Lewenhaupt’s convoy from Riga. It had been calculated that, given the size of Lewenhaupt’s baggage train, which was to contain enough supplies for the whole Swedish army for six weeks after joining the main body, the 400 miles from Riga to Mogilev would take about two months, starting out in early June. However, Lewenhaupt had problems obtaining sufficient wagons and horses, as well as difficulties in gathering the supplies. Consequently he was not able to begin his journey until late June, while the Count himself only set out to join his troops towards the end of July. Thus, while Charles was kicking his heels at Mogilev expecting to be joined by Lewenhaupt’s welcome supplies and reinforcements, these were in fact still some 250 miles away north of Vilna.[viii]

It was while Charles was at Mogilev that he received an embassy from the Hetman of the Ukraine, Ivan Stephanovich Mazeppa. It was suggested that if Charles undertook to take the Ukraine under his protection then Mazeppa would place 30,000 Cossacks at his disposal. Never one to “look a gift horse in the mouth,” Charles saw that this proposal would enable him to use the plentiful resources of the Ukraine to feed his army. For his part Mazeppa, who had originally been allied with Peter in his war against the Turks, became increasingly worried that the Russian Tsar’s reforms would cause the loss of his own independence, and therefore he had decided to throw in his lot with the Swedes.[ix]

A Cossack Hetmann at  the head of his men

With his customary impatience Charles broke camp on 5^th August, becoming listless at having to await the arrival of Lewenhaupt’s lumbering supply train. Marching close to the Dnieper River the Swedes moved south-east towards the river Soz, hoping to force the Russians into a pitched battle, which proved of no avail, the Russians retiring before their advance leaving nothing but devastation behind them.[x]

It was now that Charles, possibly for the first time in his life, became uncertain of what course of action to take. At a council of war General Rehnskjöld tactfully advised the king that they should await the arrival of Lewenhaupt’s supply train, which was now of vital importance for the subsistence of the army. After linking up the Swedes would then be able to go into winter quarters in Livonia.[xi] It was while this council was taking place that an urgent appeal to move south arrived from Mazeppa, who was becoming increasingly afraid that Peter would discover his duplicity and take measures to squash the planned alliance before the Swedes could join him. This made up Charles’s mind for him, and ignoring all other advice he at once decided to join the Cossack Hetman. As General Fuller says,

  ‘…Not only was Charles a man of impulse who never worked to a plan, but, as Napoleon points out, in this campaign he violated the principles of war: he failed to concentrate his forces; he abandoned his line of operations; cut himself off from his base; and made a flank march in face of his enemy’s army. Outside an offensive idea, Charles had no plan, and in spite of the urgency of Mazeppa’s situation, not to wait for Lewenhaupt was an act of strategic insanity. From now onward Charles’s actions increasingly show that either his faith in himself, or his contempt for his enemy, or both combined, had unbalanced his mind.’[xii]

 

General Count Lewenhaupt

Lewenhaupt of course knew nothing of Charles’s decision and continued his march to join the main army. Only on 28^th September did he receive the news that the king was marching south. His new orders were that he should cross the Dnieper and the Sozh and head for Starodub in the Ukraine. Crossing the Dnieper he reached the village of Lesnaya where, on 9^th October he was attacked by a Russian force under the Tsar himself of some 14, 500 infantry and cavalry. The battle was fiercely contested with the Swedes holding their ground all through the day. When darkness descended Lewenhaupt’s position became untenable, as many soldiers attempted to escape. Looting and drunkenness became rife, and it was soon realised that the whole baggage-train and artillery would have to be abandoned. Sharing out the draft horses and salvaging a few light carts the Swedes continued their journey, joining up with their main army on 21^st October. Of the original 12,500 men who had set out from Riga in June, only 6,000 tired and ragged men had managed to get through.[xiii]

Things had gone no better in the north where General Lybecker had attempted to take St Petersburg. Finding the place well defended he had been forced to pull back to Viborg, losing all his heavy baggage, plus some 3,000 men.[xiv]