Boldness and Good Luck. 1708

And so the New Year of 1708 brought fresh hope to the French monarch. The clouds of misfortune and doubt, which had hovered over the Bourbon throne, had cleared away, and once more the “Sun King’s” radiance shone forth.

The Act of Union with Scotland had caused widespread disaffection among the Scots, and now Louis XIV turned his attention to assisting the “Pretender,” James Edward, in his bid to seize the Scottish throne. The port of Dunkirk was humming with activity, as a task force of 6,000 French troops, together with 13,000 stands of arms was made ready to accompany the prospective King James III for a landing in Scotland.

Unfortunately the weather in February 1708 turned stormy, causing a delay of almost one month, during which time the English Parliament took prompt action, sending a fleet to blockade Dunkirk, while mobilising the militias and recalling ten regiments of foot from Flanders, the latter having a miserable time cooped up on board their transport ships during the four day passage to Teignmouth, made in gale force winds and heaving swell.

On the 17^th of March the French set sail from Dunkirk, the stormy weather having scattered the blockading squadron. On the 21^st March they arrived at the Firth of Forth, but owing to the Allied fleet now being close on their trail, it was decided to sail on to Inverness. Here the whole scheme was abandoned, as there had been little sign of enthusiasm from the Scots, and the French troops were suffering terribly from being crammed together on the wind swept decks. The French lost over two thousand men due to seasickness and the elements, also one ship was captured; ironically she was an English vessel that the French had taken in 1703. All of this did not worry the French king unduly, he had always considered the Scottish venture a hazardous undertaking, and was quite content to have what remained of his expeditionary force back in France.

Now that the crisis had passed, the ten British regiments returned to Flanders, while Marlborough set sail for The Hague on 12^th April to attend an Allied conference to discuss their plans for the forthcoming campaign. Here it was decided that all the available troops in Germany and the Netherlands should be grouped into three armies. In Flanders, under the Duke’s personal control, the main army consisted of 100 battalions and 150 squadrons; the second, commanded by Prince Eugene, complimented by a detachment from Flanders, and made up of troops from Baden-Baden, the Palatine, Würzburg and an Imperial contingent, around 45 battalions and 60 squadrons, forming on the Moselle River. The third army, under George Lewis, Elector of Hanover (the future king George I of England); 37 battalions and 47 squadrons, to operate on the Upper Rhine.¹ As well as these arrangements the Allied forces in Spain and Italy were instructed to adopt a defensive attitude.

The French, even allowing for the crippling cost of the war on the economy, still managed to put together five field armies. The main effort was to be directed against Flanders and on the Rhine. The Duke of Berwick and the Elector of Bavaria (Max Emmanuel) taking charge of the Rhine army, with Marshal Villars being sent to Dauphiné. The grandson of Louis XIV, the Duke of Burgundy, was instructed to join Marshal Vendôme, with whom he would share command of the army in Flanders, a decision that was to have grave consequences in the future. In Spain the Duc d’Orléans and Marshal Bezon would work in coordination with Marshal Anne-Jules Noailles’s army of Catalonia in an attempt to take back the eastern seaboard, while The Army of Dauphiné would go onto the defensive. For the coming campaign in Flanders the French were mustering 131 battalions of infantry and 216 squadrons of cavalry, while their Rhine army stood at around 79 battalions and 138 squadrons.²

The Duke of Burgundy

On the Allied side Marlborough still harboured the idea of a “descent” on the French coast as part of his overall stratagem for the new campaign. Thus General Thomas Erle was ordered to gather 11 battalions of British infantry on the Isle of White in preparation for a landing on either the French or Belgian coast as Marlborough saw fit. The Duke himself travelled to Hanover during the third week of April in order to allay the fears of the Elector who had become perturbed concerning his own role in the forthcoming campaign. Therefore, to appease the suspicious George Lewis, Marlborough was forced to bolster the Elector’s forces with 2000 cavalry taken from Prince Eugene’s Moselle army. The latter had been in secret contact with Marlborough and they had agreed on a plan whereby Eugene would march his army to Flanders to join Marlborough’s.

War weariness was affecting the Dutch, and the Flemish population in Flanders were heartily sick and tired of Dutch incompetence and vacillation. Thus the time seemed appropriate for the French to take the initiative, and Vendôme had received permission from the King to risk giving battle under favourable circumstances. Therefore the vexatious marshal planed to besiege the town of Huy, this would draw the Allies away from French Flanders and battle could be sought on ground favourable to the powerful French cavalry. However a serious situation now arose which was to have a major effect on the forthcoming campaign. The King’s grandson, the Duke of Burgundy, had been dispatched to share command of the army with Vendôme. This was to cause much friction between the two commanders, and dire results at the battle of Oudenarde.

Considering himself able to handle military matters as he saw fit, the 26-year-old Burgundy put forward his own plan for a direct advance on Brussels, thereby seeking to win over the disenchanted population. Although Vendôme was not in favour of the plan he nevertheless, reluctantly agreed, and the French army of over one hundred thousand men began massing around Mons. On the 26^th May they had crossed the River Haine and went into camp at Soignies. To meet this threat Marlborough, with some ninety thousand men, moved towards Hal, which caused the French to move over the River Senne in the direction of Braine I’Alleud, threatening Louvain. To this Marlborough quickly proceeded, on the 2^nd June, to march back through Brussels to his old camp at Tarbanck, covering Louvain. Fully aware that Prince Eugene was not yet ready to commence his march on Flanders, Marlborough thought it prudent to protect Brussels. ³

There now followed a month of frustration for both sides. For the French, Prince Eugene’s arrival at Coblenz had caused concern as to what possible action he may be thinking of undertaking, while Marshal Vendôme still argued for laying siege to Huy. King Louis accepted Vendôme’s suggestion, but once again Burgundy put a damper on things and on 11^th June orders from Versailles came suspending any action against Huy until Prince Eugene’s intentions on the Moselle had been fathomed. For his part Eugene only became ready to commence his march to join Marlborough on 29^th June, and this with only a fraction of the force originally intended to be at his disposal, the Elector of Hanover commandeering 25,000 of the original 40,000 troops under Eugene command. Not only this, but three days after setting out for the Spanish Netherlands, Eugene had the talented Duke of Berwick, with 27,000 men giving chase. Nevertheless, if Eugene showed his usual flair and energy, there might still be a chance to join up with Marlborough and administer a crushing blow to Vendôme before Berwick had a chance to assist.⁴ The whole month of June had been one of worrying frustration for Marlborough, who spent most of his time inspecting the troops and writing letters.

Meanwhile the unkempt and snuff covered Marshal Vendôme had been planning his next move. Working in conjunction with the French Minister of War, Count Bergeyck, both of whom were fully aware of the disillusionment of the population of the Spanish Netherlands, Vendôme sprang into action on the 4^th July, marching west and crossing the Senne River, then moving rapidly for the River Dender at Grammont. Out in front of the French main army, two flying columns, commanded by Generals Chemerault and La Motte forged ahead to secure the important towns of Bruges and Ghent, where the townsfolk welcomed the French as liberators. Thus at the cost of boot leather Marlborough’s communications with England were severed, and his supply lines to Antwerp and Holland seriously jeopardised. Unfortunately these resounding operations were undermined by the animosity that existed between Vendôme and Burgundy regarding the next stage of the campaign. Although having been advised by king Louis to take heed of what the much experienced French Marshal had to say, Burgundy still thought himself best able to judge the military situation, and both commanders, together with their respective staffs, adopted the childish attitude of speaking to one another as little as possible. ⁵

At 10 o’clock on the night of the 4^th July, Marlborough, receiving the news that the French were on the move, ordered the army to strike camp and, at 2 a.m. on the morning of the 5^th July, they were marching towards Brussels. In the early afternoon, when near the city, the Duke penned the following letter:

Having had advice last night that the enemy were decamped and that they had made a strong detachment some hours before under the command of M. Grimaldi, we have been upon our march since two o’clock in the morning, and, having noticed at noon that the detachment was advancing as far as Alost, and had broken down the bridges over the Dender, I immediately detached two thousand horse and dragoons under the command of Major General Bothmar, to pass at Dendermonde to observe them and protect the Pays de Waes. By what we learn hitherto their army is advancing as far as Ninove, and we shall continue our march according to their further motions.⁶

Unfortunately this proved to be one of those rare occasions when Marlborough’s judgement failed him. The Allied army were slowed by torrential rain, the Duke himself lost his way whilst on reconnaissance, also the news that the French had managed to occupy Ghent and Bruges caused general despondency among all ranks.⁷ The air of gloom seems to have affected Marlborough greatly, and this, coupled with his general fatigued state caused him to become halfhearted and lethargic, and as the Prussian commissary at British headquarters, Brigadier Grumbkow wrote to his king, Frederick I:

The blow which the enemy dealt us not merely destroyed all our plans, but was sufficient to do irreparable harm to the reputation and previous good fortune of My lord Duke, and he felt this misfortune so keenly that I believe he would succumb to his grief early the day before yesterday, as he was so seized by it that he was afraid of being suffocated.⁸

Prince Eugene

Fortunately Prince Eugene, having ridden on ahead of his cavalry, arrived (Sunday 8^th July)* at Marlborough’s headquarters, which were now at Assche, west of Brussels. With the arrival of his friend and fellow campaigner, the Duke’s spirits lifted, and he shook off his cloak of gloom, becoming once again the firm and resolved commander. Fully realising that the French had the advantage, the Duke now gave orders for Brigadier Chandos to reinforce Oudenarde with 700 men, while the Earl of Cadogan with a strong advance guard, followed by the main army, was to advance rapidly on Lessines to gain control of the vital crossing on the Dender River.

As noted above, the antagonism that existed between the French commanders caused both men to put forward their own plans for the continuation of the campaign. Vendôme had been all for going straight at the town of Oudenerade with a strong force of all arms, while the main French army held the line of the Dender River to oppose any moves made by the Allies. This plan was not to Burgundy’s liking, he preferring to cover northern France and their supply depots at Tournai and Lille. He therefore considered that to lay siege to the town of Menin was the better option, one that Vendôme thought far too tame; the Marshal did not wish to concede territory back to Marlborough unless forced to do so. Not being able to agree on which course of action to take, the matter was referred back to Versailles for the king’s decision. While awaiting a reply, Vendôme began to prepare the army for a move covering the Dender, while at the same time investing the town of Oudenarde.⁹

Moving rapidly, Cadogan had reached Lessines with the Allied advance guard well before dawn on the 10^th July, and realising that they had lost the option of securing the Dender River line, the French army (Burgundy’s orders again) moved north to Gavre, with the intent of placing itself between the Allies and the River Scheldt, the troops covering Oudenarde* were also pulled back to the main body, all of this to the annoyance of Vendôme who was keen to give battle.¹⁰

For the French it seemed that they had ample opportunity to scupper any Allied manoeuvres by occupying a central position, ‘…They held the cord, while the allies to forestall them must move around an arc three times as long. It was therefore with complacency that they lay on the night of the 10^th (July) within a few miles of the Scheldt, over which their bridges were a-building. Even if Marlborough’s advance troops were holding Lessines, they had plenty of time to blockade the bridgehead of Oudenarde from the west and thus put themselves behind a secure river line and within two marches of Lille.’¹¹

With Lessines secured Marlborough and Eugene now decided to make a rapid move on Oudenarde in order to cross the Scheldt before the French had completed their own bridging operations. Of paramount importance was the construction of pontoons over the river to facilitate the crossing of the army. Therefore at 1 a.m. on the morning of July 11^th Cadogan was once again sent with 16 battalions and 8 squadrons, plus the bridging train and 32 light artillery pieces to secure a crossing at Oudenarde. He also had orders to repair and improve the roads. Coming in sight of the river at 9 a.m., Cadogan informed the Duke that the French were still at Gavre. By noon the first of his British battalions were across the Scheldt, and the rest of the pontoons placed in position soon after. The French themselves, showing no particular need for haste, began crossing a Gavre around 10 a.m.¹²

At around the same hour Marlborough received Cadogan’s message and, together with Prince Eugene, he set off towards the river accompanied by General Natzmer with twenty squadrons of Prussian cavalry, ordering the rest of the army to follow as rapidly as possible. At 1.00 p.m. the Duke was clattering over one of the pontoons seeking to reconnoitre the village of Eyne, while, leaving 4 battalions to guard the bridges, the other 12 battalions of Cadogan’s command moved towards the River Diepenbeck, covered on his left flank by General Rantzau’s 8 squadrons.