Ligny

14 June
15 June
Ney's Orders
Lack of Haste
16th June
Troop Dispositions
The Battle
Appendix
French Army
Prussian Army
Battlefield in 1982
Tactical Deployments
Bibliography
Photographs

Commencement of the Battle of Ligny.

As the church clocks struck the hour of 3 p.m. they were echoed by three deep reports from the French Imperial Guard artillery as, ‘Europeans were still in the habit of opening their battles with three beats as they opened theatrical performances.’[1] While Grouchy’s cavalry made demonstrations against Thielemann’s Prussians on the French right, Vandamme sent in General Lefol’s division against the village of Saint Amand over on the left. Although Napoleon was no connoisseur of music, he nevertheless understood what effect it could have on morale, therefore each regiment had its own band which, using a prearranged program of marches would strike-up such rousing tunes as, Veillons au Salut de l’Empire, La Grenadier, and, Marche á Marengo. To the accompaniment of one of these martial airs, the French battalions, preceded by a swarm of skirmishers, moved through the tall corn in three columns. Lefol’s troops were greeted by the blast of cannon fire from the Prussian batteries along the ridge, and by a steady roll of musket fire from the three battalions of the 29^th Regiment who were defending the village, which, after a stubborn resistance, were finally forced back by superior numbers. General Steinmetz, commanding the Prussian brigade at the rear of Saint Amand, now threw-in his 12^th and 24^th Prussian Regiments, which forced the French back and regained the village. While Lefol reorganised his division for another attack, the French and Prussian batteries redoubled their fire along the whole line, filling the little valley of the Linge stream in thick clouds of billowing smoke.

Vandamme now sent forward the fresh brigades of Generals Gengoult and Dupeyroux of Habert’s division to bolster Lefol’s attack. These fresh masses soon made their weight tell against the Prussian 12^th and 24^th Regiments who, together with the original three battalions who occupied the village, were hard pressed to maintain control of Saint Amand. Steinmetz, with only the 1^st and 3^rd battalions of Westphalian Landwehr remaining in reserve, threw these troops into the village in a desperate attempt to stabilise the situation. As they came forward their commanding officers were all killed or wounded in the space of a few minutes, the 3^rd battalion in particular suffering crippling losses before it even entered the village. Steinmetz’s brigade was forced to retire to a position between Bry and Sombreffe leaving 46 officers and 2,300 men either dead, wounded or prisoners.[2] The French now moved to consolidate their gains, moving cannon down and into Saint Amand to repel any Prussian counter attacks.

On Vandamme’s right, the IV French Corps of General Gérard advanced on the village of Ligny, whose defenders, under Generals Henkel and Jagow were well protected by stout walls and banked-up hedges, together with the support of artillery batteries on each flank. As the attacking columns of French closed on the village they were greeted by a murderous fire that caused them to stagger for a moment, before bracing themselves and continuing their advance. On the outskirts of the village the French endeavoured to force their way in by main force, but were eventually driven back, leaving the ground carpeted with dead and wounded. Nothing daunted the French battalion and regimental officers regrouped their men and advanced once more, only to meet the same fate as the previous attack. By now many of the houses were ablaze, and the dense smoke from both the artillery fire and the conflagration obscured the view of the cannoniers of both armies, causing them to pour-in shot and shell blindly in the hope of not hitting their own formations. Eventually the French made a two-pronged assault on the village, forcing their way into the centre and gaining control of the Churchyard, while another column pierced the defences at the lower end of the village.[3] Amid falling masonry and burning timbers the Prussian and French infantry fought each other hand to hand, house to house, and street to street until the superior numbers of the attackers prevailed. Siborne has left us with a romantic and flowery picture of this particular part of the battle which is typical of the prose that was expected at that time:

The Battle, on this part of the Field, now presented an awfully grand and animating spectacle, and the hopes of both parties were raised to the highest state of excitement. Intermingled with the quick but irregular discharge of small arms throughout the whole extent of the Village, came forth alternately the cheering “En avant!” and the exulting “Vive l’Empereur!”as also the emphatic “Vorwärts!” and wild “Hourrah!” whilst the Batteries along the Heights, continuing their terrific roar, plunged destruction into the masses seen descending on either side to join in the desperate struggle in the valley, out of which there now arose, from the old Castle of Ligny, volumes of dark thick smoke, succeeded by brilliant flames, imparting additional sublimity to the scene.”[4]

The French were not allowed time to establish themselves in the village before the Prussians once more advanced in their turn. The 4^th Westphalian Landwehr under Major Count von Gröben, together with the 13^th and 19^th Infantry Regiments of Colonel Schütters Brigade cleared the French from the village and captured two cannon that had been abandoned as they withdrew. General von Jagows III Brigade now, ‘…made a change of front to its left, and approached the Village; the 3^rd Battalions of both the 7^th and 29^th Regiments had been detached to the right, to protect the Foot Batteries Nos. 3 and 8, and to remain in reserve; the four remaining Battalions descended into the Village as reinforcements.’[5]

Although forced to relinquish their hold on Ligny, the French still remained in possession of Saint Amand, but found it difficult to debouch from there owing to the mass batteries that Ziethen had ranged to cover the exits from the village. Napoleon now ordered General Girard’s division to attack Saint Amand la Haye, which would outflank the Prussian gun line and hinder any renewed attack on Saint Amand.

Girard’s two brigades, under Generals Devilliers and Piat, advanced in massed columns and soon cleared Saint Amand la Haye of its defenders. Seeing that this advance threatened his right flank, Blücher now sent in General Pirch II with his brigade to retake the village. At the same time the 1^st battalion of the Prussian 6^th Regiment was moved from its position near the Bussy windmill to fill the gap vacated by Pirch’s movement, while the 2^nd battalion of the 23^rd Regiment (Bose’s Eighth Brigade) were shuffled over to fill the space left by the 6^th Regiment.[6] Also noting that the French could not only attempt a direct attack via the villages of Saint Amand, and Saint Amand la Haye, but could now seriously threaten his communications with Wellington, Blücher decided to occupy the village of Wagnelé from where his troops could not only secure the afore mentioned connection with the Anglo-Belgian forces, but also deliver a flank attack on the French left. Now it was General Pirch I who commanded the Prussian II Corps who was directed to send his 5^th Brigade, under General Tippelskirchen to take and hold Wagnelé together with the cavalry brigade of Colonel Sohr and the two Regiments of the 7^th and 8^th Uhlans of Colonel Marwitz (Thielemann’s Corps). The Seventh Brigade under General Brause (Pirch I Corps) was moved forward to occupy the ground vacated by Tippelskirchen’s movements.[7] As can be seen by all this repositioning, the Prussian reserves were already being seriously thinned.

At 4 p.m. General Pirch II brigade attacked Saint Amand la Haye, but suffered severely from the French artillery fire, which tore great gaps in their ranks. Nothing daunted the survivors marched on, only to be riddled by the defenders musket fire as they entered the village. Being unable to penetrate any further than the central area of the village, and although being reinforced by the 1^st battalion of the 6^th Prussian Regiment, the attackers became stalled when they attempted a turning movement between the two villages, being confronted by a large manor/farmhouse* from which the French could not be ejected.[8]

Once more the Prussians were forced to retire, in some disorder, to their original position. The French jubilation of yet again forcing the Prussians to abandon the village was tempered by the loss of their divisional commander, General Girard, who fell mortally wounded during this engagement. Still old Blücher would not be denied, and he now ordered a renewed assault on Saint Amand la Haye to contain Girard’s division while he launched his attack on the village of Wagnelé.

Death of General Girard.

While these events were unfolding, Napoleon, from his eyrie on the Fleurus windmill, observed that the Prussians did indeed seem determined to hold their position. At a little after 3.15 p.m. he instructed Marshal Soult to send Ney the following order:

‘Monsieur le maréchal,

I wrote to you an hour ago to say that the Emperor would be attacking the enemy at half past two in the position he has taken between the village of Saint-Amand and Brye. At this moment the engagement is very sharp. His Majesty orders me to say that you must manoeuvre immediately so as to hem in the enemy’s right and give him a good pounding in the rear. His army is lost if you act vigorously. The fate of France is in your hands. Do not hesitate an instant, therefore, to move as the Emperor orders, bearing on the heights of Brye and Saint-Amand so as to take part in a victory which may be decisive. The enemy has been caught flagrante delicto as he was seeking to join the English.

Duc de Dalmatie.[9]

Edith Saunders informs us that, ‘The register of the Chief-of- Staff (Soult) shows that this message was sent out at 3.15 p.m. A duplicate was sent at 3.30 p.m., and at 3.30 p.m. also a message was sent to Lobau ordering him to bring the VI Corps up to Fleurus. This was in answer to a message that had just come in from Lobau with news that Ney was faced with enemy forces numbering about 20,000 at Quatre-Bras. Realizing from this information that Ney might, after all, be unable to manoeuvre at will, Napoleon decided to call up the VI Corps which he would probably need.’[10]

The mystery of the pencilled note that Napoleon was supposed to have sent to Marshal Ney, after sending the above 3.15 p.m. dispatch, in which the Emperor ordered Ney to send d’Erlon’s I Corps across to Ligny has puzzled historians, and caused endless speculation. Napoleon himself never mentioned any such written communication, either pencilled by himself which, given the state of his handwriting would have been almost illegible, or that he dictated the same to one of his ADCs. If Napoleon had just received information that Ney was heavily engaged at Quatre-Bras, then he would not have deprived him of a whole army corps. How and who actually ordered d’Erlon’s divisions to march on Ligny remains one of the enigmas of this campaign.

That morning d’Erlon’s Corps was concentrated around Jumet, Ney’s orders to move on Frasnes arrived at midday, but owing to Reille’s corps moving to their appointed position, d’Erlon was obliged to wait until these troops had cleared the road. At the commencement of the battle of Quatre-Bras, d’Erlon had only reached Gosselies. At 4 p.m. the General rode forward ahead of his troops to announce that his corps was about to arrive on the battlefield. It was during his absence that the famous pencilled note ordering the whole corps to change direction and march on Ligny arrived. The ADC who delivered these instructions convinced d’Erlon’s divisional commanders that the orders came directly from the Emperor himself, and forthwith the whole corps changed direction towards Villers Perwin. The bearer of the message now galloped after d’Erlon himself who was nearing Frasnes, and upon catching up with him showed him the note and informed him that his corps was moving towards Ligny. d’Erlon himself says that it was Labédoyère, one of Napoleons favourite ADCs who delivered the message, and if anyone could recognise a member of the Emperor’s staff it was d’Erlon. Thereafter the phantom messenger told d’Erlon that he would ride on and show Marshal Ney the note and explain Napoleon’s intentions, ‘and after that we hear no more of him. He vanishes from the scene.’[11]

Back on the battlefield of Ligny the French and Prussians continued their attacks and counter attacks against the burning villages. The heat of the day coupled with the fires and smoke from burning buildings made the atmosphere within these confined spaces almost unbearable. Blackened with powder smoke and grime the soldiers of both sides fought each other with a savage determination, no quarter being asked or given. *

Blüchers preparations for a renewed attack on Saint Amand la Haye were now complete. At a little after 4.15 p.m. Pirch II once more advanced his battalions against the village, clearing it of the French at the point of the bayonet; Major Quadt commanding the 28^th Regiment together with elements from Tippelskirchen’s brigade also forcing the enemy to relinquish their hold on the manor/farm buildings which had proved so much trouble to previous attacks.[12]

Simultaneous with this attack General Tippelskirchen launched a vigorous assault on Wagnelé. Although managing to occupy the village without too much opposition, when they endeavoured to debouch towards the French position they were assailed by a heavy fire from French infantry concealed amongst the tall corn. This caused such disorder within their ranks that the whole Prussian attacking force fell back to their original position at the rear of the village. Seeing that the Prussians were in a state of confusion after their retreat, the French now renewed their attack upon Saint Amand la Haye, moving columns of infantry on both flanks of the village, as well as attacking it directly from the front. Blücher bolstered the defence of the village by sending the 3^rd Battalion of the 23^rd Regiment from Colonel Langen’s Eighth Brigade, and soon after also sent in the 3^rd Battalion of the 9^th Regiment together with the three battalions of the 26^th Regiment (all from General Krafft’s Sixth Brigade). These fresh troops allowed Pirch II to withdraw his shattered battalions to a reserve position near Bry, and managed to contain the French attack.[13]

Around Ligny, General Henkel’s Fourth Prussian Brigade supported by General Jagow’s (Third Brigade) still held the village and its approaches. A counter attack by the 1^st and 2^nd Battalions of the 7^th Regiment (Jagow’s Brigade) was ordered against the French who were once more preparing to advance. This resulted in both sides volleying each other at close range until still more battalions were pushed forward from Percheux’s French division which compelled the Prussians to fall back into the village. Here the fighting took on a new savagery with men lashing out with musket butts, cold steel and bear hands. As Siborne so graphically describes it:

‘The fight throughout the whole village of Ligny was now at the hottest: the place was literally crammed with combatants, and its streets and enclosures were choked up with the wounded, the dying, and the dead: every house that had escaped being set on fire, was the scene of a desperate struggle: the troops fought no longer in combined order, but in numerous and irregular groups, separated by houses either in flames, or held as little forts, sometimes by the one, and sometimes by the other party; and in various instances, when their ammunition failed, or when they found themselves suddenly assailed from different sides, the bayonet, and even the butt, supplied them with a ready means of prosecuting the dreadful carnage…The earth now trembled under the tremendous cannonade; and as the flames, issuing from the numerous burning houses intermingled with the dense volumes of smoke, shot directly upwards through the light grey mass which rendered the Village indistinguishable, and seemed continually to thicken, the scene resembled for a time some violent convulsion of nature, and rather than a human conflict- as if the valley had been rent asunder, and Ligny had become the focus of a burning crater.’[14]

Eventually the French gained possession of the Churchyard, and consolidated their hold on it by bringing forward two pieces of artillery, which spewed canister amongst the ranks of the Prussian 7^th Regiment, and the 1^st Battalion of the 3^rd Westphalian Landwehr (both of Jagow’s brigade). Try as they may to evict their antagonists, after a further three unsuccessful attempts, the Prussians finally withdrew to the outskirts of the village.

Prussian and French infantry fighting in Ligny (Painted by Knötel).

At just after 5 p.m., seeing the depletion of the Prussian reserves, and having kept an adequate mass of decision in hand for just such an eventuality, Napoleon now ordered the Imperial Guard, together with the cuirassier division of General Milhaud to break the Prussian centre. While these formations were making their way forward General Vandamme galloped across from the left wing bringing news that a massive enemy column was marching on Fleurus, and only some three miles away with the intent, it seemed, of turning the French left. Ney and d’Erlon had both been instructed that if they could join in the defeat of the Prussians, then they were to approach by way of Saint Amand. Vandamme was convinced that part of Wellington’s army had come across to succour the Prussians, and when an officer from his staff who had been sent to identify this new development came riding back shouting, “They are enemies, they are enemies!” the panic caused soon spread along the ranks like wild-fire. General Lefol’s division broke back in panic and Girard’s division (now commanded by Colonel Matis, the two other generals of brigade being wounded) was forced to abandon Saint Amand la Haye to meet the threat of a flank attack. Lefol turned his cannon on his own men to stop them fleeing the field.[15]

Napoleon remained calm, but suspended the attack of the Guard while the situation was clarified. After sending one of his own ADC’s to investigate the mysterious column, he supported Vandamme’s wavering corps by dispatching the Young Guard under General Duhesme to the left wing. The aide sent by the Emperor returned after about one hour with news that the column was French, but that for some inexplicable reason it was now turning away from the battlefield!

These troops were, of course, d’Erlon’s divisions who had been obeying the instructions given by the mysterious ADC carrying the pencilled note. The reason for its approach march was, in all probability due to nothing more than a mix-up in place names. Since it has been assumed that d’Erlon was to make contact with the French left wing at Wagnelée, but was found to be bearing on Fleurus, the simple answer is that Wangenies, near Fleurus, had been mistaken for Wagnelée.

Poor d’Erlon was once more confronted with a dilemma. After coming within sight of the battlefield of Ligny he had received yet another order, this time from Marshal Ney, who in a fit of fury at being deprived of almost half his original force had, upon being informed that d’Erlon was marching towards the Ligny battlefield, sent an urgent message instructing the general to retrace his steps and return to Quatre-Bras. This order was not only to deprive Napoleon of a resounding victory over the Prussians, but is hard to justify because, with the distance involved, it would mean that d’Erlon’s troops could not possibly arrive back before nightfall. Also the fact that both Ney and d’Erlon were aware that the order to move the I Corps across to Ligny came from Napoleon himself, then it seems strange that both men chose to disobey a direct command from their Emperor? That there was indeed a state of uncertainty in d’Erlon’s mind is shown by the fact that before turning to march back towards Quatre-Bras, he dropped off Durutte’s division and his cavalry facing Wagnelée in case they would be needed.

Napoleon himself can also be blamed for the fact that, once knowing that the column was French, he did not send one of his ADC’s with explicit instructions for it to manoeuvre against the Prussian right flank. Thus the failure to bring Lobau’s corps onto the battlefield in time for it to play a decisive role in the defeat of the Prussians, coupled with the lack of precise instructions to d’Erlon when he was within striking distance of the enemy would seem to show that Napoleon had lost his grip on the situation, and that, in the final analysis it was his lack of firm control and judgement that cost him the crushing victory he so much required.

Time had past, and it was not until 7 p.m. that order had been restored on the French left. Vandamme, with the aid of the Young Guard units sent by Napoleon, had at last recovered his former position, while around Ligny the Prussians units were being reduced and exhausted by the constant fighting. The French had pummelled this section of the line to such an extent that now all that was required was an injection of fresh force, which would split it asunder. As dark masses of thunderclouds began to roll across the sky, the Imperial Guard artillery, together with the batteries posted along the front unleashed a terrible bombardment from over 200 cannon.

Now, at 7.45 p.m. to the accompaniment of peals of thunder and flashes of lightening the massed ranks of the Imperial Guard with cries of “Vive l’Empereur!” moved forward in a deluge of warm rain to the attack. As they descended into the little valley of the Linge stream the French batteries fell silent. Sweeping everything before them the Guard cleared Lingy with the bayonet, and was soon climbing the heights towards the Brye.

Blücher, who had been over on the Prussian right came galloping back only to find his centre shattered. Nevertheless the old hussar still had fight left in him. As the rain stopped and the setting sun pierced the gloom with its dying rays he called up General Röder’s 32 squadrons of cavalry and, placing himself at their head led them against the squares of the French Guard.[16] Amid the chaos and confusion Blücher’s horse was shot, and as it fell pinned him to the ground so that he was unable to rise. Count Nostitz, one of his aides-de-camp tried unsuccessfully to free him as the Prussian cavalry was driven back by the Milhaud’s cuirassiers. These mounted giants, unable to recognize what a prize was within their grasp owing to the failing light, charged on past the Prussian commander, and were in their turn forced to retire by a spirited counter attack made by a regiment of Prussian Uhlans. After being passed twice by enemy cavalry, Blücher was at last freed and led to safety.

The Perilous position of Marshal Blücher (Painting by Philippoteaux)

The Prussian centre had been completely smashed and was retiring in disorder, however the stubborn defence put up by the two wings of their army prevented it from becoming a rout. On the right General Ziethen slowly fell back behind Brye, managing to take most of his artillery off the field and showing a bold front to Vandamme’s weary divisions, while on the left General Thielemann retreated unharmed, Leaving a strong rearguard at Sombreffe.[17]

The battle had cost the Prussians 16,000 in killed and wounded, together with the loss of twenty-one cannon, and during the night after the battle a further 8,000 men deserted their army. The French losses were between 11,000-12,000, and Girard’s division had been whittled down so much by casualties that it remained near Fleurus for the rest of the campaign.

Napoleon had his victory, but it was not a decisive one. His neglect in not calling up Lobau’s Corps earlier in the day, coupled with his failure to send direct orders to d’Erlon when that general’s troops were so close to the field, show a total lapse of his normal military principles. By not having all his forces gathered together on the main battlefield he wore-out what he had and ignored what was available. The fact that he divided his army once again after the battle of Ligny, sending 30,000 men to pursue what he considered to be a “ defeated foe”, admits to the fact that eventually oversights and blunders like these were bound to tell against him in the end.

Graham J Morris
May 2004