Ligny

14 June
15 June
Ney's Orders
Lack of Haste
16th June
Troop Dispositions
The Battle
Appendix
French Army
Prussian Army
Battlefield in 1982
Tactical Deployments
Bibliography
Photographs

Dispositions of the Opposing Forces, 14^th June.

Theatre of Operations.
(click to enlarge)

With the massive coalition of Russia, Austria, Prussia, Italy and England ranged against him in 1815, over 600,000 men, Napoleon had little choice other than attempting to knock one or two of his adversaries out of action before they could join forces and overwhelm him. To this end he decided to throw his weight against the nearest allied armies, those of the Prussians and Anglo-Dutch-Belgian. These two army groups were, in early June 1815, widely dispersed across Belgium. The Duke of Wellington, commanding the Allied army of 93,000 men was placed so as to protect the roads from Lille to Mons. The Prussian army of 117,000, commanded by Field Marshal Prince Blücher von Wahlstadt covered the Charleroi-Brussels main highway and the country to the east, their line of communications running through Liége. On the 14^th of June the Allied armies were stationed as follows-

• Anglo-Dutch/Belgian 1^st Corps under the Prince of Orange, Quatre-Bras to Enghien;

• 2^nd Corps, Lord Hill, from Enghien to the River Scheldt; 

• Reserve Corps, under Wellington himself, Brussels; 

• Dutch-Belgian Cavalry on the River Sambre; 

• Heavy Cavalry around Grammont-Ninove; 

• Prussians, 1^st Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General von Ziethen, Headquarters at Charleroi; 

• 2^nd Corps, Major General von Pirch I, Headquarters at Namur; 

• 3^rd Corps, Lieutenant General von Thielemann, Headquarters at Ciney; 

• 4^th Corps, General Count Bülow von Dennewitz, Headquarters at Liége.

As can be seen from the map below, the town of Charleroi formed the connecting link between the Prussians and Anglo-Dutch/Belgian forces, It was here that Napoleon intended to strike his first blow, in the hope of separating the two allied armies from each other. This tactic had served him well on numerous occasions, and would allow him to deliver a crushing defeat upon one of his adversaries before turning against the other.

 
Initial positions of the opposing armies up to the 14^th-15^th June 1815. 
(click to enlarge).

With great secrecy the various French Corps of the Armée du Nord were marched to their respective locations along the French-Belgian frontier. On the 14^th June they were: - Left wing, I Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Count Drouet d’Erlon at Solre-sur-Sambre; II Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Count Reille at Leers; Centre, III Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Count Vandamme, and the VI Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Count Lobau, around Beaumont; Imperial Guard, commanded by Marshal Mortier, Duke of Treviso (not present with the army during the campaign), to the rear of Beaumont. Right wing, Reserve Cavalry, four corps, commanded by Marshal Count de Grouchy, between Beaumnot and Philippville; IV Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Count Gérard, approaching this wing from the direction of Metz. It can be seen from these dispositions that Napoleon had assembled his forces of almost 125,000 men within striking distance of his enemy’s advanced posts before Blücher and Wellington had been able to take any defensive measures:

‘Thus we get the rule that if the detached groups are nearer together than two full day’s march they can hardly be separately defeated, and a great risk is run of being caught between the enemy’s forces as they concentrate on the battlefield itself, thus bringing about the envelopment of the force in the central position…But supposing Blücher and Wellington did not fall back to concentrate on their own lines of communications, then their only other course was concentration on their inner flanks to oppose his (Napoleon’s) advance on Brussels. Napoleon, well served by his cavalry (sic) and by spies, was aware that Blücher could concentrate on his right 24 hours earlier than Wellington could on his left…Consequently Blücher might well be attacked and defeated before Wellington could complete concentration. It would appear, therefore, that an advance by the Charleroi-Brussels road afforded an excellent prospect of defeating the Allies in succession, whatever action they took.’[1]

With the exception of the left wing of the French army, which was to cross the River Sambre at Marchienne three miles to the west of Charleroi, all the remaining corps were to cross the bridge at Charleroi itself. Much has been said concerning the reason why Napoleon did not pass over the Sambre on a wider front, enveloping the I Prussian corps of general Ziethen before it could fall back to join the main body of the Prussian army. However, moving thousands of men and horses, as well as hundreds of cannon is not as simple as moving pieces on a chessboard, and Napoleon, once concentrated, saw no need to try to “bag” one Prussian corps when his intentions were to destroy their whole army. One of the most amazing things is that Ziethen, well knowing that the French were before him in great strength, did not destroy the bridges over the Sambre before falling back? Even allowing for the excellent work of French sappers and engineers, who would have been able to throw pontoons across the river, as well as working to repair the damaged bridges, the time consumed in these tasks would, in all probability, have allowed Blücher and Wellington to concentrate all their forces to meet the French advance.

The contempt Napoleon had for his enemies can be seen in the way in which he worded his “Order of the Day,” which I give here in full: