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The Battle.Well before the commencement of the battle General Ligonier had been trying to persuade Cumberland to hold the advanced villages in more strength and, ‘…Cumberland’s inadequacy as a general was never better illustrated than by his original intention to ignore the existence of these natural bastions, and to range his army on the bare plain behind them in a single fighting line….[i] It was only by his perpetual pestering that Ligonier finally managed to make Cumberland understand that the best way of blunting any French attack was to break it up by using the villages as military bulwarks, rather like a breakwater on the seashore. It was after all Ligonier who had seen what strongly held villages were capable of doing to attacking formations after his experience at the battle of Fontenoy. However Cumberland still vacillated to such an extent that the villages of Lauffeldt and Wiltingen were first occupied in great strength, then evacuated, reoccupied again, and once more evacuated before being finally occupied for a third time![ii] This indecisiveness shows Cumberland’s total lack of ability, and total ignorance of any real military knowledge. The final order to reoccupy the villages came only an hour before the French began their assault, and gave scant time for the men to put the houses and farms into a state of defensibility. During the confusion Cumberland had also sent orders that the villages should be destroyed, and was unable to countermand these instructions before some of the buildings were set on fire. Thus, not only were the defenders hard pressed to secure the villages against attack, they were also now partially blinded and suffocated by thick clouds of smoke.[iii]
General view across the battlefield (note the spelling of the various villages)
From his vantage point on the Heerderen heights, de Saxe had been scanning the field through his telescope since 6 am in the morning. A heavy rain was now falling, and this coupled with the smoke and the perpetual movements of the allied infantry to and from the villages caused de Saxe some anxiety. The French king, Louis XV, had joined his troops to be present at the battle and he concurred with de Saxe that either Cumberland was trying to confuse them as to his true intent by all these convoluted movements, or that the allied commander was in such a state of uncertainty that he may even be considering quitting the field and placing his army under the guns of Masstricht, and as the Marquis de Valfrons informs us, ‘For more than two hours, the Marshal believed that the enemy was manoeuvring to recross the (River) Meuse; he was confirmed in his opinion when he saw that Laffeldt was on fire.’[iv] Therefore the French Marshal was only too happy to help Cumberland speed his withdrawal. To this end de Saxe compiled his battle plan. After sending forward an armed reconnaissance of nine battalions, he would launch an overwhelming attack using the mass of his infantry in brigades, one behind the other against the allied left centre at Lauffeldt. Simultaneously an outflanking move by the French cavalry would take place against the allied left flank around the village of Wilre in order to place themselves between the Maastricht and Cumberland’s retiring columns. Under this erroneous assumption de Saxe ordered forward Clermont’s grenadiers, supporting them with a further two brigades of infantry. These troops came on in fine style, drums beating and standards slapping soggily around their staffs expecting to receive nothing more than a sporadic fire from their supposedly retiring foes. The reception they actually got came as quite a shock, for as well as the disciplined platoon firing and rolling volleys, which carpeted the plain with many white uniforms, Ligonier had also had the presence of mind to push forward a battery of artillery which was sited with such skill that its fire ploughed long lanes through the advancing French masses. Much to de Saxe’s chagrin he now realised that his enemy apparently had no intention of retiring but was now committed to holding their ground and making the French pay dearly in trying to gain it. While de Saxe pondered the situation Valfrons rode up to him and offered some words of comfort and encouragement, ‘Marshal, you beat them at Fontenoy, when you where dying. You beat them at Rocoux when you were still a sick man. Today you will slaughter them!’[v] The redoubtable Marshal soon shook off his disappointment at having his plans scupperd by Cumberland’s unintentional ruse de guerre and set about altering his battle plan back to their original form. He had, after all, expected that the villages would be occupied in the first place, and as this was now the case then all that he need prove was; ‘…he still had faith in his own dispositions.’[vi] As the shattered remains of his grenadiers fell back from Lauffeldt, de Saxe ordered Clermont to form a new attacking column and take the village. He also sent the Marquis de Saliéres with another massive infantry force against Wiltingen. The battle for the two villages was a murderous affair. The French Marshal’s determination to break through the allied centre was met by the equally determined resolve of the Landgrave, Frederick II of Hesse-Cassel, who commanded the German and British infantry in this sector, to show him just how futile this would prove against his stalwart battalions. The fighting went on for four hours with the French forcing their antagonists out of the villages four times, only to be evicted on each occasion at the point of the bayonet. For once, showing a spark of military intelligence, Cumberland kept his fighting troops supplied with a constant flow of reinforcements from his second line, and he even ordered nine battalions of Austrian infantry over from his right flank in preparation for a general advance which he felt sure would unhinge the by now, disorganised French masses in the centre.[vii] Indeed de Saxe had already paid a heavy price attempting to secure the two villages and could do little else other than raise the stakes even further. As Clermont’s shattered battalions recoiled for the forth time, de Saxe sent forward the regiments of La Fére, Ségur, Bourbon, Bettens, Monnin, Monaco, Royal Marine, Vaisseaux and d’Aubeterre, together with the fighting Irish regiments of the “Wild Geese.” These tried and true veterans move forward in magnificent order, only to be cut down in windrows by the terrible hail of lead and iron sweeping the approaches to Lauffeldt and Wiltingen. The chevalier Dillon, commanding the gallant Irish brigade was mortally wounded and taken prisoner, while the Comte d’Aubeterre fell, together with twenty-two of his officers and scores of his men within the smouldering ruins. After committing forty battalions to the bloodbath, de Saxe was still no closer to breaking the allied line, but it was far too late now to consider any alternative plan other then the one he had set in motion. After watching the destructive fire from a thirty-gun battery which had been suddenly unmasked by the allies, and which tore great gaps through the cavalry lines of the Régiment du roi, which had been drawn up in support of the infantry, de Saxe threw any restraint he may have still harboured to the winds. Unsheathing his sword he now ordered the Marquis de Saliéres forward to take Lauffeldt with twelve fresh battalions.
Once again the French infantry came under a tremendous blizzard of fire, but a lodgement was finally made in Lauffeldt. Pressure was also beginning to tell in Wiltingen, where the allied infantry were slowly being forced back house-by-house. Seeing the chance of slicing through the enemy centre at last, de Saxe charged towards Wiltingen with a mass of cavalry. It was at this point that Cumberland himself was considering going over to the offensive, however the advancing squadrons of French horsemen had to be dealt with first. Ordering forward his Dutch cavalry, Cumberland fully expected to be able to contain de Saxe’s sudden impetuosity and throw his whole attack back in disorder. Things were not to be however. The Dutch cavalry were seized by panic at the approach of the French, and turning their horses about began to quit the field. As if this were not bad enough, their flight took them directly into the lines of their own infantry stationed behind. Utter confusion now prevailed, with foot and horse trying desperately to untangle themselves while being hacked at by the triumphant French cavalry. The most vulnerable section of the allied position was at last falling apart, and the French infantry now began to move forward to exploit the gap.[viii] As if to compound his woes, Cumberland now received news that the French had taken the village of Wilre on his right flank, and that squadron upon squadron of their cavalry were about to charge this part of the allied line.
On this part of the field General Ligonier had been studying the gathering host of French horsemen, but was still unaware of the disaster that had befallen the allied centre. As a professional cavalryman himself he fully appreciated the fact that a full-blown cavalry encounter was in the offing and, ‘Tempted by the occasion at last offered of opposing our cavalry in the plain to that of the enemy he gave orders to advance upon them.’[ix] ‘Ligonier’s Charge’ has been passed down as one of the most outstanding exploits of the British Army, and was one of the greatest cavalry encounters in military history. The encounter involved some sixty allied squadrons attacking one hundred and forty of the enemy, throwing the latter back in such disorder that five French standards were captured and the village of Wilre was retaken. The charge also allowed a breathing space for the allied infantry in the centre to regroup and begin to fall-back in good order. Although the issue of the battle had now been decided firmly in favour of the French, Ligonier was still ready to get in amongst their squadrons yet again while they were still reeling from the effects of his first charge. As he was regrouping his forces for the next round a messenger galloped up bearing orders from Cumberland to cease any further attacks as Lauffeldt was now in enemy hands. The allied commander’s message also contained strict instructions that any unauthorised moves by Ligonier would have to be accounted for after the battle.[x] Ligonier immediately sent back a note informing Cumberland that, in his opinion, one more charge by the cavalry could well restore the situation for the allies, however the time taken to find Cumberland and for him to grudgingly give permission for a second charge worked in de Saxe’s favour and allowed him time to restore order in his lines.
With the French squadrons now regrouped, Ligonier was well aware that de Saxe would now attempt to clear a path through the allied cavalry screen and get in amongst the confused ranks of infantry struggling in their rear. Whether or not Cumberland would make him face a court martial for disobeying orders, Ligonier considered that he had to sacrifice his squadrons to save the infantry.[xi] Drawing up the Royal North British Dragoons, the Inniskillings Dragoons and the Duke of Cumberland’s Hussars, Ligonier threw them head on into the mass of French cavalry. The shock of their impact was so great that the British horsemen broke clean through the bewildered enemy formations scattering them right and left. This penetration was to prove not only glorious, but also fatal to the now reduced British squadrons. Behind his cavalry,de Saxe had positioned several battalions of infantry and these, together with the arrival of fresh French cavalry upon their flanks, decimated Ligonier’s already depleted ranks. The General himself was surrounded while trying to bring forward some Hessian cavalry to help extricate his horsemen, and by some quick thinking on his part he suddenly cried to the French troopers to ‘Halt,’ stating in his native tongue that they were to turn and concentrate on another part of the battlefield.[xii] Unfortunately for Ligonier he was recognised as an important enemy officer by the Star of the Order of the Bath, which he wore on his uniform. Offering his captives his watch and his purse, which were refused, his sword was then taken and he was led off the field to be presented as a prisoner before the French King.[xiii] Ligonier’s charge had cost the British cavalry dearly, but it had stalled de Saxe’s plans sufficiently to allow time for Marshal Batthyany to bring across the rest of his Austrian infantry, thus placing a strong defensive screen between the French and the retreating allied formations, allowing them time to march off the battlefield. White tells us that, ‘Valfrons- at heart, alas! something of a lickspittle- censures Maurice (de Saxe), in his memoirs, for his conduct of the pursuit after Lauffeldt. He asserts that when, at Wiltingen, the Dutch cavalry broke, Maurice could have started the route by sending in Clermont-Tonnerre and his dragoons. ‘He thus proved to me,’ Valfrons says, ‘that since he did not wish to end the war, he could only half win the battle.’ White goes on to say this charge was frequently levelled at de Saxe but ‘…is surely nonsense. There would seem to have been little doubt that, at least on this occasion, Maurice strained every nerve to destroy the beaten enemy army. He knew that his failure to do so would have serious personal and political consequences. But what more could he have done? His right wing had been disorganised by Ligonier’s attacks: the Austrians had strongly and suddenly intervened after the battle had already been raging for a full six hours; the rain was still pouring down; the battlefield had been churned into mud; and smoke was billowing thickly across the landscape from the batteries and the burning villages.’[xiv] With the above being said, it would seem that Cumberland did indeed have a lucky escape, which throws still more light on the fact that he was not a competent commander. The result of the battle, and his conduct during its course, should in no way detract from the fact that the allied troops, given their proper placement at the commencement of the battle could, under more resolute leadership, have seriously compromised the whole of de Saxe’s plans. The cost on all sides had been considerable. Over 2,000 British casualties, 2,500 Hanoverian and almost 2,000 from the other allied contingents. The victorious French had paid an even greater price in killed and wounded, totalling 14,000 men. The battle had cost a good deal of blood. Never was anything more horrible seen. The plains and villages all around were covered with dead and wounded men. The loss on this day, on one side and the other, amounted to more than 20,000 men killed, wounded or taken prisoner.[xv] Even after his appalling display at Lauffeldt, Cumberland was once again given the command of the Hanoverian Army during the Seven Years War (1756-1763). He was defeated by the French at the Battle of Hastenbeck (July 1757), and thereafter put his name to the Convention of Klosterzeven (September 1757) in which he promised to evacuate Hanover. This was the final straw for George II who immediately repudiated the terms of the convention and dismissed his son from command of the army. It has been said that Cumberland was a good administrator but a bully and a martinet. This being so, perhaps his true vocation was as the leader of a press-gang rounding up unwilling recruits from the taverns of England?
Graham J. Morris.
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