The grand tactical theory behind the dynamics of
the assault remained unchanged: the battalions were to engage the
enemy in a series of firefights, at an ever-decreasing range, and
break the enemy’s will to fight by a succession of ordered
volleys. The advance was to continue until the enemy opposite the
battalion began to fire, at which point the colonel ordered the
drummers to stop. Turning to face his men once more, the colonel
ordered the men to halt and the drummers to beat a
“preparative.” As soon as this order was given, the men in the
six platoons of the first firing, and all the men in the first rank
(except those in the two centre platoons) were to prepare themselves
to fire. The front rank knelt, and placed the butts of their muskets
on the ground at their feet and angled their weapon upwards. This
posture was assumed to defend themselves from cavalry. The men in
the rear two ranks closed in on the front rank, and kept their
thumbs on the cocks of their muskets taking care to keep their arms
“well covered.”
…When the first firing was to fire, the
colonel ordered the drummers to beat a “flam.” The men in the
front rank dropped the muzzles of their muskets to the ground, while
the two rear ranks presented their arms. The officers and subalterns
in these platoons made certain that the muskets were levelled
according to the range of the enemy so that the volley would have
the best possible effect. At the same time, they had to caution
their men to withhold their fire until the next orders on the drum.
As soon as the first firing was properly
presented, the colonel ordered a second “flam” to be beaten, and
the men fired their weapons. Immediately, these men recovered their
weapons, fell back and started to load as fast as they could. The
sergeant’s task at this point was to see that this reloading was
done without hurry or disorder. The men in the first rank did not
fire and were part of the battalion reserve fire. These men kept
their muzzles on the ground and their thumbs on the cocks. The
colonel then immediately ordered the drummers to beat the second
“preparative,” and the platoons in the second firing prepared
themselves to fire. The same set of orders and drumming was used to
command this firing to fire.
When the second firing had fired, the same
procedure was followed for the third firing. In theory, this routine
was followed to produce a near-continuous fire, without significant
hesitation between firings. If the need arose for the reserve to
fire, the colonel ordered the first rank of all but the two centre
platoons to present arms, and then the same set of commands was used
as for the other firings.
If at any point during the firing the enemy
started to retreat, the men were ordered to cease-fire. The next
firing were to “half-cock” their weapons and be ready to fire
later. The battalion was to march after the retreating enemy, rather
than waste ammunition and time firing upon them. This was yet
another reason why it was important for the colonel, as opposed to
the captains, to control the firings. The firings would tend to
continue for a much longer time when the captains controlled the
firings of their individual platoons.
On the other hand, should the enemy infantry
maintain their ground, the British battalion was to recommence its
advance. Another “preparative” was beaten to order the next
firing to make ready. Ordering the battalion to march, the colonel
waited until the first rank was two paces from him before turning
around and marching himself. The nearer a battalion approached the
enemy, the closer he was to position himself near the first rank.
This was important; otherwise he would stand out as an easy mark for
enemy fire. When the battalion arrived at the appropriate distance
away from the enemy holding its ground, the colonel was to order the
battalion to halt. Immediately, the front rank knelt as before and
the rear ranks closed forward. On the next “flam,” the next
firing fired its muskets. The colonel now went through the same
orders as before, making the various firings deliver their fire as
quickly as possible until the enemy started to give ground.
Official doctrine purposely avoided prescribing
what was to occur in the final moments of an encounter, where the
threat of actual contact was imminent. This was left to the
discretion of the battalion’s commanding officer. The one
enjoinder was that should the enemy retreat faster than could be
followed while still maintaining order, the infantry was to stop and
continue firing until the enemy was out of range. The task of
pursuit was left to the cavalry. 11
The British Cavalry.
Up until the first several campaigns of the
Seven Years War, British cavalry doctrine had not significantly
changed from that used during Marlborough’s time. The Duke of
Cumberland’s instructions on how British dragoons were to conduct
themselves during combat is illustrative of all British cavalry
during this period.
When attacking, the dragoon regiment was to form
a column of squadrons, each squadron deployed in two ranks. Prior to
advancing, the men were ordered to draw their swords, then shorten
their bridles, before bringing their swords to their thighs. Some of
the officers and quartermasters in each troop did not participate in
the charge but rode behind the squadron to rally anyone attempting
to flee and bring them forward with the next squadron in the column.
The advance was begun at a walk or slow trot
until the squadron had advanced to about sixty paces from the enemy.
At this point, the squadron commander would order his men to
“trot-out,” that is, ride forward now at a fast trot (canter).
As in Marlborough’s time, the emphasis was
placed on maintaining strict order within the squadron formation.
The troopers were to remain knee to knee throughout the charge. The
next rank was to keep itself close enough to the first rank to push
it toward the enemy, yet distant enough to avoid being stopped in
its tracks if the first line was defeated.
The squadron commander if possible was to
attempt to have the squadron advance obliquely to the right as it
advanced, to be able to take a portion of the enemy line in flank as
they met. In actuality, given the level of British cavalry training
at this period, this proved difficult in practice and the two forces
usually met head-on, if they actually closed to contact.
If the attack proved to be successful, the
squadron was to halt at the position previously indicated for this
purpose by the squadron commander. Here, it was to reorder itself to
be able to respond to an enemy counter charge or wait to be
supported by the squadrons following in column behind it. Should the
first squadron’s charge be checked instead, its men were to ride
to the left and right to clear the front so that the squadrons
behind could continue the attack.
…The British cavalry lacked the thorough
training and appears to have never have mastered the multiphased
aspect of the Prussian (cavalry) charge at the gallop. British
cavalry tended to charge enthusiastically without being able to
maintain the tightness of formation….
…The Hanoverian cavalry appears to have been
even more conservative, relying on the traditional advance at the
trot and, the discharge of firearms prior to closing with the sword.
One interesting feature of the Hanoverian cavalry charge was that
the troopers in the third line (of the squadron) would “double,”
that is, they would close into any space provided by the intervals
between squadrons of files within the squadron to tighten up the
formation….12
French Infantry tactics.
|
French Infantry 1747
|
Although the years between the War of Spanish
Succession and the War of Austrian Succession saw a proliferation of
theoretical works about the need for new drills, exercises,
manoeuvres and even tactics in the French army, very few changes
were actually officially approved between 1713 and 1749.
Whatever changes were made can be summed up in a
paragraph. By the outbreak of hostilities in 1740, the French
infantry battalion now consistently deployed in four ranks.
Previously, when a portion of each battalion had been armed with
pikes, the company was nothing more than an administrative unit,
without any tactical meaning at all. However, once all of the men
within the battalion started to be armed identically, the company
began to be treated as a tactical subdivision of the battalion. The
training camp of 1733 officially recognized this development;
henceforth a company was referred to as a “section” in this
capacity.
However, the battalions continued to be arranged
in the same fashion; the officers and subalterns were positioned
according to the regulations of 1703, while the distance between the
ranks and the files remained unchanged. Unfortunately, the highly
cumbersome and time-consuming methods of deploying from column into
line from line into column also remained virtually the same,
although there was no lack of unofficial experimentation by the more
enterprising regimental commanders.
In terms of fire systems, the only progress that
could be pointed to was that the French troops no longer performed
the caracole version of fire by ranks. Prior to 1749-1750 there was
never any official mention of either cadence marching or a cadence
manual of arms (loading and presenting the weapons). The troops were
still forced to march with open ranks (six paces between ranks), and
had to close ranks before they either changed direction of march or
deployed.
The conservatism within the French army ran
deep, that despite Puységur’s constant lobbying for the use of
continuous lines of infantry, en muraille, the battalion
along each line officially were still to be deployed with a full
interval separating them and their neighbour as late as 1750,
despite the fact that, practically speaking, this method of
deployment was abandoned during the War of Spanish Succession!
Fortunately for the French, this last regulation appears to have
been rarely, if ever, carried out during this era, there usually
being too many battalions to deploy across the battlefield to permit
such wide intervals.13
French cavalry tactics.
|
French Cavalry Uniform
|
…By the 1730’s and 1740’s the French had
become more aware of the value of shock and the role of speed in
winning close order combats. In his Reveries De Saxe stated,
“Such that cannot go at speed over a couple of thousand yards to
pounce upon the foe, is for nothing in the field.” However,
Colonel Mack’s comments that Austrian cavalry could not gallop 50
yards without 25 per cent of the horses becoming disordered were
probably as applicable to French cavalry.
At the Battle of Fontenoy (1745), Marshal de
Saxe ordered his cavalry to break the British infantry column that
had advanced behind the French lines, using the “breast of their
horses.” Of course, given the sharp rows of enemy bayonets,
cavalrymen never found this an easy task.
The debate over whether firearms should be used
by cavalry started to slacken; with most cavalry officers believing
they should never be used during a battle when meeting their enemy
counterpart. According to Grandmaison:
“A horseman should never use his pistols but
on the most pressing occasions, either to save his life, or
disengage himself from some disagreeable situation.”
…The French continued to believe that
cavalry capability against infantry and other cavalry was largely
the result of “weight of horse.” When attacking enemy infantry,
French cavalry used a different set of tactics. Previously, French
cavalry had used pistol or carbine fire when attacking formed
infantry. However, the success of this method declined with the
adoption of the socket bayonet. Also, any attempt to have an entire
line of cavalry close with a line of infantry, necessarily resulted
in extensive casualties because of the number of men exposed to
musket fire. These considerations, as well as exposure to new
methods used by Austrian light cavalry during the first two
campaigns of the War of Austrian Succession, led the French to
develop new cavalry tactics during the mid-1740’s.
These newer tactics were based on the principle
that a few brave and experienced men would create the necessary gaps
in the enemy infantry’s line, and then the remainder of the
squadron would exploit these. The fewer numbers of men initially
exposed to enemy fire would mean correspondingly fewer casualties.
Each squadron leader commanding experienced troopers would have
15-20 of his bravest men, presumably his “commanded” men
positioned on each flank of the squadron, attack the infantry in
line while the remainder of the squadron advanced in an orderly
fashion behind them. His first wave advanced at the trot until 20
paces or so away from the line then moved in at the gallop.
The concentration of muskets directed against
this handful of horsemen was such that most, if not all, would be
hit by the resulting fusillades. However, it was an accepted cavalry
maxim that only 50 per cent of the horses and men hit by musket fire
would be disabled, and, in fact, if the attacking cavalry was
sufficiently close when fired upon, the remainder generally
redoubled their efforts upon being hit. This interesting observation
was made by General Grandmaison of the Volontaires des Flandres:
“ The other half [of those hit by
gunfire] animated by the fire and the blood, fall with fury and
impetuosity on the infantry, whose breastworks of bayonets is not
able to sustain the weight of the horses in fury. The rider cannot
any longer command them, they rush headlong, and make openings for
the rest of the squadron, to penetrate and break the battalion,
which cannot oppose this shock, a manoeuvre sufficiently quick and
exact.”
It had long been known that horses would not
voluntarily impale themselves upon the hedge of bayonets offered by
an ordered line or a square. The above strategy was to position the
attacking cavalry close to the line or square being attacked at the
moment of fire, so that the horses infuriated by the pain of their
injuries, especially those in the chest, would forget the danger of
the bayonets and in their agony involuntarily move onto the infantry
they were attacking.
…If any gaps were created in the line of
infantry, the remainder of the squadron still in good order would
attack the line. It should be pointed out, however, that this attack
could be delivered at a trot at the quickest, since the squadron
would have been 20-30 paces behind the leading elements. It was
hoped that the first group of attackers would, contrary to the
wishes of the enemy officers, succeed in drawing the fire of all the
enemy ranks. Then when the main body of horsemen closed, the
infantry would be caught without fire. The cavalry, under these
circumstances, could advance to contact much more easily, and the
infantry were much more inclined to break.
…Unfortunately for the French, there was a
downside to these tactics. Although they fulfilled their purpose of
reducing the number of casualties incurred in any localized attack,
by their very nature they tended to work against massive attacks,
conducted in unison, against large enemy formations.
The ineffectiveness of piecemeal charges
conducted with limited forces was demonstrated clearly at Fontenoy,
where a number of French cavalry regiments were thrown one at a time
against the British (and Hanoverian) column that succeeded in
penetrating the French line between the redoubts in the Wood of
Barry and that of Fontenoy. Only the assault led by De Vignecourt
had any success. This officer and 14 men managed to momentarily
break through the enemy formation but were immediately killed or
wounded. All these attacks, made without any initial preparation or
agreement and made with limited forces, were defeated by the
compactness of the British formation and the steadiness and
discipline of the British platoon fire.14
