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The Battlefield.
The Bistritz River is no more than a small tributary of the Elbe. On its east bank the ground rises in a series of slopes and undulations that soon form a small chain of hills that overlook the approaches to the river from the west. These hills had been strongly fortified with abatis and earthworks and ran from Problus northward to the villages of Lipa and Chlum. From there the ground dipped and then rose again to the hills of Maslowed and Horenowes, falling away again to the Trotina River, on Benedek’s right flank. Two tight clusters of woodland, each approximately 1,600 meters square each, the Holawald and the Sweipwald, stood in front of the villages of Lipa and Maslowed to the north; and in the south, at Neu Prim and Problus, two more woods, the Steziek wood and the Briza wood, abutted from the main Austro-Saxon position itself. For two days before the battle, Benedek’s inspector-general of artillery, Archduke Wilhelm of Austria, had reconnoitred the area, positioning his artillery so that it had a clear field of fire and marking the ranges for his excellent rifled cannon. On the high ground at Lipa and Chlum, many batteries were placed in tiers overlooking the approaches from Sadowa and the Bistritz Valley. There, on July 3rd, 1866, the fate of Germany was to be decided. Benedek’s forces were divided into four groups. In the centre, at Chlum-Lipa, III Corps an X Corps held the line-in all, some 44,000 men and 134 guns. Both corps had units well forward near the Sadowa bridge to dispute the crossing On the left, the Saxons and VIII Corps, comprising of 40,000 men and 140 guns, held the sector composing of Techlowitz, Neu Prim, Ober Prim, Nieder Prim and Problus, also with outpost lines pushed well forward towards the Bistritz crossing points. On the right- and by far the weakest position on the field- stood IV Corps and II Corps with 55,000 men and 176 guns, between Chlum and Nedelist. Entrenchments had been dug and massive gun emplacements constructed along the ridge that ran between these two villages, but they were themselves overlooked a little farther north by the heights of Maslowed and Horenowes. Both flanks of the Austrian position were covered by a cavalry division. Between Rosberitz and Wsestar, I Corps and VII Corps, together with the heavy cavalry and artillery, formed a reserve mass of 47,000 infantry, 11,435 cavalry and 320 guns. The weakness in Benedek’s position, a rough semicircle with both flanks resting on the Elbe River, was that it would be difficult to meet an enveloping attack, since the Austrian main line of retreat ran along the Sadowa-Königgräz highway and was therefore susceptible to being cut. Quite possibly the Austrian commander did not expect that the Prussian Second Army would be able to join the battle, thinking that he would be confronted by only the two other Prussian armies in a frontal attack against his prepared positions? Owing to a total lack of reconnaissance on their part, the Prussians did not know the whereabouts of the Austrian army, and there was some consternation at headquarters as to whether Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm would arrive in time, should Benedek make a stand. Even so, Moltke managed to keep a cool head, although suffering from a heavy cold. He sent out patrols, which on 2nd July discovered the Austrian position. Then, orders were dispatched to the Second Army urging all possible speed in descending upon the Austrian right flank. The Prussian VI Corps and the Guard Corps divisions which were nearest to the Austrians, still had no hope of reaching the battlefield until midday on the 3rd July; the other units of the crown prince’s army would not arrive until much later. It appeared that the Prussian Elbe and First armies would have to fight alone for at least four or five hours against the full weight of Benedek’s army.
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