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Hope, Doubt and Failure. Day Three.With the return of Stuart’s cavalry Lee, now more determined than ever to force a decision, devised a plan that would follow the same basic pattern set on the previous day. Ewell would conduct a diversionary attack against the Union right flank, while Longstreet, now with Pickett’s fresh division on the field, would use it in conjunction with divisions from A.P.Hill’s Corps to smash through the Union centre, and Stuart would then be in position to move around to the left and disrupt the enemy’s line of retreat. For some unaccountable reason, Lee never sent orders to either Pickett or Longstreet stating his intention to begin the assault at daybreak, although he did manage to send one to Ewell. Consequently, precious time was lost in grouping the various elements of each division and brigade into the correct positions for the assault. It has been suggested that Lee was biding his time in order to discuss the overall situation with Longstreet, who he had selected to lead the attack[1] Whatever his reasons, Lee went in search of the man he fondly christened, “My War Horse” to gauge his feelings. If he expected overwhelming support and enthusiasm for his plan from Longstreet, he was soon disillusioned by the attitude and tone adopted by his top corps commander. Lee had not rode far along Seminary Ridge when the thunder of cannon drew his attention to his left flank. Here, before Lee’s courier had chance to reach Ewell with his instructions for the day, Union General Henry Warner Slocum, commanding the Union right wing had decided to re-establish his line as it had been before the Confederates under General Johnson had taken over their rifle pits on Culps Hill. Slocum’s attack began at 3.45am, and wrecked any chance of combining Ewell’s Corps effectively in the planned offensive. Although the Rebels eventually had to abandon their hard won gains, they still put up a stubborn resistance until they were finally forced off the hill and back to their original line along Rock Creek at its base.
Pickett Charge - Day 3, July 3rd. None of this seems to have ruffled Lee, even though his original plan was now dropping to pieces, he still had the mind-set to deliver a crushing blow to the Union centre, and the fact that Ewell’s Corps would no longer play any contributing role in it did not faze Lee in the slightest. Eventually arriving at Longstreet’s headquarters just before dawn, Lee was pleased to find that the general appeared to have regained his usual fighting spirit, despite the losses that his corps had sustained in the previous days fighting. The heavily bearded Georgian pointed out to Lee that he still considered a turning movement around the Union left flank to be feasible, but his mood soon changed when his chief stated categorically that, “The enemy is there,” motioning with his hand towards the Union centre along Cemetery Ridge, “ and I am going to strike him.”[2]. These words plunged Longstreet back into his cloak of depression and gloom, for he understood that once Lee had made up his mind nothing would shake his resolve. When asked by Lee how many troops he thought the attack would require, Longstreet said that in his professional opinion it would take at least 30,000 men to reach and breach the Union line, and once again his chief choose to ignore this advice.[3] What the Confederate commander envisaged was an attack just to the north of the ground Longstreet’s men had attacked the day before. To this end he considered that the fresh division under Pickett, together with Heth’s division (now under Brigadier General James J. Pettigrew), and two brigades from Major General William Dorsey Pender’s, now under Major General Isaac R. Trimble (both from Hill’s Corps), would converge towards a point in the Union line generally considered to have been a small clump of trees, but whether Lee actually used this landmark as a direction finder is open to debate [4]. On the right flank of the attacking columns, and supposedly acting in close support, only two brigades, those of Brigadier General Cadmus M. Wilcox and Colonel David Lang took an active part[5]. The number of troops that actually took part in the advance is also the subject of conjecture, since casualty lists were, at best, a matter of guesswork after the slaughter of the previous two days. Only Pickett’s division can be estimated with some certainty-5,500 infantry with the colours. The other divisions and brigades collectively contributed around 7-8,000 men, giving a total of some 12,000 plus[6]. 
The “clump of trees.” A close-up view from the Confederate lines as they drew near. The grove of trees is preserved by replanting periodically (copyright Allen Goodall 2003) In preparation for the attack Lee had instructed Longstreet to saturate his objective with mass artillery fire, which would breach the Union line prior to the advance of the infantry. Longstreet’s artillery commander, Colonel Edward Porter Alexander deployed seventy-five guns in line north of the Peach Orchard, another sixty-three guns were grouped several hundred meters to the rear and left of Alexander’s line along Seminary Ridge, while a further twenty from Ewell’s II Corps were placed on Oak Hill at the northern end of McPherson’s Ridge to knock-out the Union batteries on Cemetery Hill. Across on the Union side Major General Winfield Scott Hancock, commanding the centre, had stretched out the 5,500 men of his three divisions so that they could bring every rifled musket to bear to the front, backed by the massed fire from batteries placed in support. At 11 am an eerie silence fell over the battlefield, only punctuated here and there by the occasional crackle of skirmishing fire or the single report of a cannon. The men of both sides tried to busy themselves digging-in, playing cards or writing letters. Union soldiers along Hancock’s line dismantled the fences around their position, using the stout rails and post to construct breastworks. Officers and soldiers in both blue and grey knew that the lull was the precursor of something momentous. 
Looking from the Southern end of Seminary Ridge toward the “clump of trees” seen near the centre of the horizon. (Copyright Allen Goodall 2003) It came in a hail of flying metal as, at 1.00 pm two Confederate guns announced the signal for the bombardment to commence. Within seconds the peace was shattered as over 300 cannon from both sides took up the challenge hurling their long-range shot across the mile wide valley that separated the two armies. For over an hour the hillsides erupted with fire, smoke and exploding caissons. The Confederate artillery was prone to firing too high, as well as suffering from poorer quality ammunition (a habit they never seemed to be able to get out of), but still managed to cause much damage to Union troops and equipment in their rear area. Also Alexander, who was monitoring the effects of the bombardment never had a clear field of vision once the valley became filled with black powder smoke, and his judgement on the damage being inflicted was reduced, in the main to listening for the sounds of Union batteries falling silent. His troubles were compounded by the fact that although some of their guns were certainly put out of action, others along the Union line were ordered to cease firing so that they could conserve their ammunition for the infantry attack that was to follow [7]. Worried himself about his own depleted supply of long range shot, Alexander sent a hastily written note to Pickett, ‘For God’s sake come quick. The 18 guns have gone (referring to a group of batteries near the clump of trees which, in fact had been replaced by others who had not commenced firing). Come quick or my ammunition will not let me support you properly.’[8]. Upon receiving this information Pickett immediately rode over to consult with Longstreet, finding him sitting on a post and rail fence observing the bombardment. Pickett dismounted, passed Alexander’s note over to him and, as Longstreet failed to show any sign of acknowledgement, Pickett asked, “General shall I advance?” The only gesture that Longstreet made was a nod of the head, thus the order for one of the most famous charges in military history was not communicated either in writing or in words [9]. Assuming that Longstreet was not “nodding-off”, Pickett saluted saying, “ I shall lead my division forward, sir.” Gorgeous George Pickett, his perfumed dark brown hair cascading in ringlets down to his shoulders, and wearing a tailor made new uniform spurred his horse along the line of his division halting to look at the faces of the men he was about to lead for the first time into battle. Then standing up in the stirrups he raised his sword exclaiming, ‘Up men and to your posts! Don’t forget today that you are from old Virginia!’ While Pickett was forming his division for the assault, Longstreet, finally arousing himself from his lethargy, mounted his horse and rode out to consult with Alexander. Upon enquiring about the effect the Confederate fire had had upon the Union position, Longstreet was chagrined to learn of his artillery commander’s worry about the almost exhausted state of his own ammunition. This fact caused Longstreet to order Alexander to stop Pickett until supplies could be replenished, yet another case of passing on the responsibility of the attack to someone else. Alexander quickly explained that the supply trains had been moved further back, out of the range of Union gunfire, and that the time taken to replenish his ammunition would allow the enemy to recover and resupply themselves. These facts convinced Longstreet that any further delay would place the whole plan in jeopardy, and with a heavy heart he accepted what fate would decide [10]. 
A view from the Union position looking across towards Seminary Ridge. The monument just visible in front of the screen of trees is the Virginia State Monument. If one drew a line from this viewpoint, back toward the State Monument it would follow the route taken by Pickett’s division. (Copyright Allen Goodall 2003) At 2.30 pm the Confederate regiments and brigades began to form their lines of battle. Pickett’s division, forming the right of the line, deployed the brigades of Kemper and Garnett in the first line with Armistead’s to the rear of Garnett in support. To Garnett’s left, at a distance of about 500 meters Pettigrew’s division began to deploy, with Trimble’s two brigades to his rear. The advance of Pickett’s division would consist of a series of left obliques, bringing it into line with Pettigrew and Trimble whose march would be direct. The two converging lines were stretched out for over a mile, this distance reducing as the divisions came together for the final push against the Union centre [11]. To go forward with the infantry, Alexander had managed to scrape together 18 cannon, the only ones with enough ammunition remaining to support the attack. 
North Carolina Monument. The view is from the Confederate position on Seminary Ridge. Looking straight ahead one can see the “clump of trees” on the horizon marking the approximate centre of the Union line. (Copyright Allen Goodall 2003) Eyewitnesses have described the scene, as the long lines of Confederate infantry broke from the cover of the trees. One observer noted, “ They seemed impelled by some irresistible force…the glittering forest of bayonets in superb alignment moved forward with a determined, unhesitating step” [12]. Unfortunately Union cannonballs had no such sentiments.
Pickett’s three brigades moved through the Confederate gun line for about 100 meters and commenced the first left oblique, as they did the Union guns opened on them with devastating effect. Men fell in scores along the advancing line; one shell alone exploding among the 11th Virginia Regiment killed or wounded sixteen men [13]. Each time a gap appeared the stalwart Rebels closed ranks and pressed on, but men were falling so rapidly that the continuing left shoulder movements to dress the lines caused an involuntary slowing of the pace, and consequently allowed more fire to be poured into their midst. The Union batteries at the lower end of their line enfiladed the whole of the Confederate formation, and to add to their discomfort the troops in the left flank brigade under Colonel John M. Brockenbrough, who were trailing a little behind the main line, drew the attention of Major Thomas Ward Osborn’s 31 Union cannon situated on Cemetery Hill. As they tried to recover from this pounding the Confederates were then assailed in the flank by a withering fire from the 8th Ohio Regiment, which had been pushed forward from their main line. All this proved too much and Brockenbrough’s men fell back in disorder to the rear, sowing confusion in Trimble’s ranks as the fugitives pushed through them in their struggle to get clear [14]. Over on the right, Pickett’s line also came under enfilading fire from the Vermont regiments under Brigadier General George Stannard who had also advanced his brigade from the main Union line and then swung it 90 degrees to the right. The fire from these troops caused Kemper’s Confederate brigade to crowed-in to their right, mingling with Garnett’s troops and giving the Union artillery and infantry an even denser mass to fire into. 
These caissons mark the position of Cushing’s Union batteries, which did so much damage to Pickett’s division. The Confederate attack came in from the right. (Copyright Allen Goodall 2003) As they drew closer to the Union position the rebel’s pace quickened, and soon they broke into the “double-quick”, not only to come to grips with their foes, but also to get clear of the terrible killing fields of Union fire. Pettigrew and Trimble’s divisions also became intermixed, but continued to push on to the Emmitsburg Road, some elements even managed to get within 10 meters of the Union line (see photograph below), but here they were finally halted, shattered and spent. Many troops lay flat on the road waving hats, handkerchiefs and paper as a sign of surrender [15], the remainder fell back in confused groups to their own lines. 
The North Carolina Monument. The cannon along the wall show how close these troops came to the Union line. (Copyright Allen Goodall 2003) As Garnett’s brigade was endeavouring to clear the fence on the opposite side of the road, Armistead’s regiments came up in their rear adding their impetus and causing the whole mass to roll forward. Kemper’s regiments also came packing in from the right, desperately trying to get away from the Federal flanking fire. “Boy’s, give them cold steel.” shouted Armistead as he took off his hat and jabbed it onto the point of his sword. Garnett and Kemper went down, but somehow Armistead and 150 men managed to reach the Union gun line unscathed. Here they burst upon the line of Brigadier General Alexander Webb’s Pennsylvanians. Only having been in charge of his brigade for a short time, Webb tried to urge his men on by grabbing the standard of the 72nd Pennsylvania Regiment, only to have it torn back from his grip by its burly bearer who did not recognize his commanding general. The brigade moved forward a few steps, fired a volley into the crowd of Rebels, but refused to charge. Webb dashed to another regiment, the 69th Pennsylvania, who also refused to budge. It seemed that no one in the brigade knew just who this berserker general was [16].
Armistead, as the only general officer to reach the Union line unscathed soon drew the attention of the enemy’s fire. He took three bullets, one in the leg, one in the arm, and one in the abdomen. “Pressing his left hand on his stomach, his sword and hat…fell to the ground. He then made two or three staggering steps, reached out his hands trying to grasp the muzzle of what was then the 1st piece of (Union general’s) Cushing’s battery, and fell.”[17]. Having pierced the Union line, the troops who managed to follow Armistead were too few and too disorganised to hold on. Here the charged collapsed in what has been described as the ‘High water mark’ of the Confederacy. Although two supporting brigades under Lang and Wilcox did attempt to come forward, they only served to cover the retreat of the shattered Rebel formations. Of the 12,000 or so men who had been involved in the charge over 6,000 were either killed or wounded. As the remnants dribbled back to Seminary Ridge, General Lee rode out to meet them. Doffing his hat, he tried to steady his men’s nerves with praise tinged with sorrow, telling them that it was all his fault, and that he had realised too late that he had asked them to do the impossible. Reining in his trusty horse, Traveller, he told Pickett gently to form what remained of this division in the event of a Union counter attack. Pickett, looking bewildered and gaunt replied, “ General Lee, I have no division.” Lee continued quietly, “Come, General Pickett, this has been my fight and upon my shoulders rests the blame.” George Pickett never forgave his commanding general for destroying his division [18]. This was not quite the end of the battle, while Pickett’s men were being decimated on Cemetery Ridge, some miles further to the northeast, General J.E.B. Stuart’s Confederate cavalry, following Lee’s orders to try and get around the Union position, had failed in their attempt to cause disruption in the enemy’s rear. Clumsiness and muddle caused the adventure to be something of a fiasco, and Stuart’s troopers were forced to withdraw. As a final gesture, Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick (known to his men as “Kill Cavalry.”) had, at around 5.30 pm, received the news of the defeat of Pickett’s charge. Seeking to make a name for himself in the annals of warfare, Kilpatrick ordered Brigadier General Elton J.Farnsworth to charge the Rebel line on their right flank, considering, somewhat naively, that he could roll-up their line. Protesting vigour, Farnsworth said that he thought it would be suicide to commit his troopers to attacking enemy units who had not taken part in the attack, and who were prepared to meet any eventuality after that event. Nevertheless Farnsworth was ordered to carry out his advance, the result of which proved his point, and cost him his life, as well as those of several dozen of his command [19]. The Losses in this great battle were more poignant than is usual in war. Not only was it a nation in conflict with itself, but also families within that same nation that fought bitterly against one another for what they each firmly believed. Thus the cost in dead and wounded, well over 50,000 men from both sides, left little to show other than how cultural ideas and dogma can tear countries and families apart. After standing his ground for another day on the corpse littered fields of Gettysburg, General Robert E. Lee finally, on July 5th, withdrew his army back to their old campaigning grounds of Virginia. Almost another two full years of conflict and bloodshed lay ahead, but the Army of Northern Virginia never again took the offensive.
[1] See, Shelby Foote, The Civil War, A Narrative, Vol II, page, 526 [2] Earl J.Hess, Pickett’s Charge-The Last Attack at Gettysburg, page, 6 [3] Ibid, page, 9 [4] Ibid, page, 387-388 [5] For an account of the actual brigades and regiments, which did or did not take part in the charge, together with the strange use of depleted units instead of comparatively fresh ones see, Earl J. Hess. Pickett’s Charge- The Last Attack at Gettysburg. Page, 36-75 [6] I have studied the figures given in the numerous sources and consider the above total to be as good as any, and possibly better than most G.J.M [7] See, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. III, Page, 357-368 [8] Earl J.Hess, Pickett’s Charge- The Last Attack at Gettysburg. Page, 125-165 [9] This is a strange story, as we seem to have only Pickett’s and Longstreet’s account of just what took place. The fact that Pickett never wrote an official account of the charge, and if he did there is some evidence to support the case that Lee himself ordered it destroyed makes one wonder who was covering up for who? [10] Earl J.Hess, Pickett’s Charge- The Last Attack at Gettysburg, Page, 158-162 [11] See Map [12] Edwin B.Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command, Page, 503 [13] Earl J.Hess, Pickett’s Charge-The Last Attack at Gettysburg, Page, 172 [14] Ibid, Page, 190 [15] Edwin B.Coddington, The Battle of Gettysburg, A Study in Command, Page, 514 [16] Curt Johnson and Mark McLaughlin, Battles of the American Civil War, Page, 94 [17] Earl J.Hess, Pickett’s Charge-The Last Attack at Gettysburg, Page, 263 [18] Earl J.Hess, Pickett’s Charge-The last Attack at Gettysburg, Page, 326 [19] Edwin B.Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command, Page, 524-525 |
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