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The Battle: 11th May 1745Cumberland reconnoitred the French position on 10th
May and decided to pin down the French right wing by attacking with the
Austrian and Dutch contingents between Antoing and Fontenoy. While these
attacks were being made the British and Hanoverians would advance between
Fontenoy and the Bois de Bary across what appeared to be open ground. The
Pragmatic Army was comprised of 56 battalions of infantry and 87 squadrons
of cavalry supported by 80 cannon, in all around 53,000 men.
Cumberland’s plans proved impractical as they were based on very
incomplete and hastily gathered information. He was not fully aware of the
strength of the garrisons of Fontenoy and Antoing, and even less
appreciative of the redoubts on the French left. At 6am on the mourning of May 11th the Pragmatic Army began to deploy from the west through the villages of Vezon and Burgeon, under a heavy fire, and it was only now that Cumberland became aware of just how strong the French position really was. The attacks against Antoing and Fontenoy were beaten back by a terrible fire of cannon and musketry. On the Allied right confusion and muddled orders and counter orders caused an attack by British and Hanoverian troops on the Redoubt D’Eu to be badly handled by General Ingoldsby. His troops came under massive canister and musket fire at close range forcing them to retire with heavy losses. While the Allied attacks on the French left and right were being driven back the British cavalry had deployed across the plain in front of Vezon. Here it was exposed to a withering fire from the French artillery but remained motionless while Cumberland and General Ligonier commanding the main body of the British infantry formed his regiments for an attack through a shallow valley and up the gentle slope of the plateau, across which ran the sunken road lined by 5000 French infantry. At about 10.30am the British infantry, followed by the Hanoverians moved through the intervals of the cavalry lines, dressed ranks and began to advance to the steady beat of the drum. With their standards slapping in the breeze they began to climb the plateau. At every step men were killed or wounded, but the lines continued to advance. The fire from Fontenoy and the Redoubt D’Eu caused the column to compress in on itself until it became a compact mass 15,000 strong. When they were within 50 meters of the French front line the British infantry raised their muskets and fired as one man, shattering the well-ordered ranks of the French. Without pausing the British pressed on across the sunken road and into the heart of the French position. Here they were assailed by squadron after squadron of the finest cavalry of France, including the Maison du Roi, while the Irish regiment of Dillon attempted to come in on the British right flank, only to be beaten back by the steady roll of controlled musket fire. Away on the left the Dutch had once again been forced back with heavy losses while attacking Antoing and Fontenoy, and this in turn enabled the French commander to divert still m ore fire upon the “Infernal Column”. Nevertheless the British and Hanoverians held their ground for almost four hours finally falling back when five more Irish regiments and 7 battalions of Swiss and French Guards assailed them. The retreat was carried out in good order with the British turning about to deliver punishing volleys into the ranks of their pursuers. Cumberland has taken much of the blame, and rightly so, for the way in which he handled the battle; however the attack against the French centre could have been decisive. As Frederick the Great later remarked,’ A quarter- wheel to the left or the right would have brought victory’. Even Marshal de Saxe himself declared that,’ I did not think any general would be bold enough to venture such an attack’. As it was the Pragmatic Army lost almost 10,000 men, while the French suffered between 6,000-7,000 casualties.
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