Eylau

French Cavalry
Men & Horses
Myth & Glory
The Charge
Russian Army
The Weather
Bibliography
Photographs

The Russian Army

The formation of the Russian army at the commencement of the battle tells us a great deal about how they manoeuvred on the battlefield. Much criticism has been levelled at Benningsen's deployment of his forces, but there may have been good reason for him choosing to concentrate his army in the way he did. [Petre pp179] tells us of the Russians, 'standing out when the atmosphere was clear, in sharp relief against the white snow on the bare slope, without any cover whatever'. The reason for the Russian commander forming his troops into compact masses could well have been the state of the ground. When we consider that the snow was several feet deep, then to move companies and battalions in linear formation would have coursed the ranks to become disordered and distorted while stumbling through heavy snow drifts, likewise the same for the cavalry; whereas solid columns were able to manoeuvre rather like a snow plough enabling them to keep some form of alignment. The argument that the Russians must have formed lines otherwise Murat's cavalry could not have been said to have broken through several of these during the charge depends on ones idea of how these 'lines' were made up. I can find no mention of the Russians forming squares during the French cavalry attack, normally the only way of meeting such a threat without disaster. What I consider happened was this - once again allowing for the state of the ground- each regiment/battalion in column formation faced their flank files outward and their rear rank back to receive the attack. Those formations that had become disordered during the advance from the main position simply lay on the ground allowing the enemy cavalry to pass over them while lunging upwards with their bayonets, thus causing much damage to the poor horses. Some strong evidence that many of the Russian infantry prostrated themselves in the snow comes from several sources, and the fact that they rose up again and faced to their rear as the French cavalry retired seems to suggest that it was a planed action which allowed for the conditions of the ground, and the fact that the attacking cavalry could not employ their normal battlefield formations [Jomini pp361]. 

There is no mention of the capture of any Russian artillery pieces, nor of the cavalry rendering them useless by driving nails into the vents, or breaking the sponge staves so that they could not be swabbed out [Fuller pp531].  No standards seem to have been captured, and very few, if any prisoners were taken. Napoleon was not convinced that the charge had done anything other than stall the Russians, and he certainly did not expect to exploit it by sending in the Foot Guards to complete the victory. It was nothing more than a desperate throw by a desperate man, who had insufficient resources on the field, and treated his enemy with contempt. The Great Cavalry Walk should be seen as part of a battle in which both sides were, in all probability, performing in slow motion. The high death toll on both sides seems to indicate a bloody fight to the finish, but in reality most of those reported killed probably died from the cold and sheer exhaustion. The expression to "Lie like a Bulletin" may have derived not from Napoleon wishing to play down the real numbers of his soldiers who had been killed in action, but to cover up his own failure in not supplying them with adequate food and clothing before entering into a campaign for which he, and they were totally unprepared.